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Abstract 
This thesis covers the conflict between public accommodation law and the First 
Amendment.  It uses Elane Photography v. Willock as a case study to explore this 
conflict further.  It expands on current literature by suggesting that not only religious 
businesses should be offered First Amendment protection, but that there is potentially an 
independent solution to the problem. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Your company does not offer your photography services to same-sex couples?”1 
“Yes, you are correct in saying we do not photograph same-sex weddings, but again, 
thanks for checking out our site!”2 
     This exchange took place over email, as a potential customer inquired with Elaine 
Huguenin, co-owner of Elane Photography LLC, about the possibility of her company’s 
providing photography services at a same-sex ceremony.
3
  Following this 
communication, Vanessa Willock, a lesbian in the above same-sex couple, instigated a 
discrimination complaint against Elane Photography LLC.
4
   The matter was first heard in 
front of the Human Rights Commission of New Mexico in April of 2008.
5
  The outcome 
was that Huguenin was found to have discriminated against Willock on the basis of her 
sexual orientation.  The hearing at the Human Rights Commission prompted the case’s 
movement through the New Mexico state court system, for the next six years, until finally 
the case was denied certiorari at the Unites States Supreme Court, in 2014.
6
 
     The case’s final resting place was with the New Mexico Supreme Court, which upheld 
the Human Rights Commission’s decision. The ruling of discrimination based on sexual 
                                                 
1
 Willock v. Elane Photography, Inc., HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 5 (N.M. Human Rights Comm'n 
Apr. 9, 2008), available at http:// volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf. 
2
 Id. at 5. 
3
 Id. at 5. 
4
 Id. at 1.   
5
 Id. at 1. 
6
 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S.Ct. 1787 (2014).  
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orientation was confirmed, and Huguenin was ordered to pay damages of $6, 637.94 in 
attorney’s fees to Vanessa Willock.7  The New Mexico Supreme Court’s ruling presents 
an unwavering civil and social rights conflict, wherein the First Amendment, Public 
Accommodation laws, religious freedom, and discrimination conflict, theoretically, 
practically, and legally.
8
    
     Elane Photography LLC v. Willock (Elane) occurred in a time of national turbulence 
and movement surrounding gay rights, same-sex marriage, and religious 
accommodation.
9
  In this way, Elane was uniquely positioned in terms of the national 
discussion, but also in terms of the concurrent United States Supreme Court session.
10
  Its 
unique position and controlling outcome with respect to future cases in New Mexico 
make Elane a compelling lens through which to study Public Accommodation laws in 
New Mexico and the United States.   
A. Inquiry 
     This thesis is examining the answer to four research questions and provides a potential 
solution to the unique discrimination that is Elane.  The four questions answered are as 
follows.  First, in Elane was there a loss of First Amendment rights?  Second, was the 
New Mexico Supreme Court decision allowing same-sex marriage influential in the 
outcome of Elane?  Third, is the United State Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. 
                                                 
7
 Elane, No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 20. 
8
 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014). 
9
  See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 160 (2014). 
10
 Id. at 155.   
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (“Hobby Lobby”) a gateway to reaffirm religious freedom in 
business owners?
11
 Fourth, can reform of Public Accommodation laws reinvigorate First 
Amendment rights in LLC owners?  In answering these questions as a whole, the solution 
is not per se legal, in that it adjust current laws, but is a social suggestion that could 
impact society’s interpretation of our freedoms.  The solution is to create a separate 
independent certification agency in a small town that instead of brandishing those 
businesses that do discriminate, certifies those that don’t with a visible marking to 
consumers.  These questions are answered and the solution is developed and discussed in 
full.  
Additionally as a benefit to the reader, this thesis has collected all fifty states’ Public 
Accommodation laws for the benefit of the reader, in Appendix A.  There has not been a 
collection of all fifty Public Accommodation laws in one place since 2005.
12
  The 
author’s categorization of the laws, discussed later, makes it easier to understand the 
suggested “narrowing” of their application, as discussed in the presentation of results in 
the final section of this thesis.  By understanding the United States’ collection of Public 
Accommodation laws, one can more easily understand the controlling position of Elane 
with respect to the other states’ interpretations of similar conflicts within their own 
jurisdictions.         
B. Current Impact and History 
                                                 
11
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
 
12
 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MONOGRAPH ON STATE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAWS app. 3 
(2005). 
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Though Elane was heard in the New Mexico Supreme Court in 2013, its impact has 
resonated with business owners in other states.  Among those making the news are 
bakers, a florist, and an auto mechanic, all of whom have found themselves in similar 
quandaries, where their religious beliefs prevent them from serving lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, or queer (“LGBTQ”) customers.13  The quandary exists because 
the businesses they own in their respective states—Oregon, Washington, and Michigan—
are classified as Public Accommodations and therefore must serve LGBTQ customers. 
The conflict Elane represents is thus continuing.  This thesis will explore Elane 
specifically and offer a discussion of a possible solution. 
Elane can be well understood by following its passage through the courts, where 
multiple bodies of law were drawn from; these bodies of law will be consecutively 
discussed in this thesis.  The First Amendment “prohibits the making of any law 
respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, abridging 
the freedom of speech….”14 For our purposes, it is particularly important to understand 
the portion of the Amendment that reads the making of any law.  This phrase refers to 
Congress.  But in the event that a private business owner follows the law and registers her 
business, and the business happens to be classified as a Public Accommodation in her 
                                                 
13
 Maxine Bernstein, Lesbian Couple Refused Wedding Cake Files State Discrimination Complaint, 
OREGONLIVE.COM, Aug. 14, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/gresham/index.ssf/2013/08/lesbian_ 
couple_refused_wedding.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.400 (West); 
Charlie Craig and David Mullins v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Feb. 13, 
2015, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/charlie-craig-and-david-mullins-v-masterpiece-cakeshop (last 
visited April 30, 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West); Michigan Auto Repair Shop Says Yes 
to Gun Owners, No to Homosexuals, CNN.COM, Apr. 17, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/ 
04/17/us/michigan-business-bans-openly-gay-people/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 37.2301 (West). 
 
14
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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state, there is a chance that her free exercise of religion may be constrained or, similarly, 
that her speech may be compelled.
15
  The jurisprudence upholding the First Amendment, 
however, dictates that Congress cannot make laws that compel or forbid speech.
16
  
Through the same jurisprudence, it has been generally established what constitutes 
speech.
17
  How it is possible for photos to be categorized as speech will be clarified in the 
thesis, as well as precisely how this First Amendment jurisprudence developed. 
     The Public Accommodation laws of all states are rooted in the history of the United 
States’ Civil Rights Movement.18  These laws were created with the intention of 
abolishing segregation in places of public accommodation.
19
  Their creation was plagued 
by disagreement and controversy, which persist today.
20
  Each state has a varied 
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; each law is listed in Appendix A.
21
 The 
premise of these laws, designed to create acceptance and equality, conflicts with a 
business owner’s ability to freely express herself.22  This conflict was not simply 
                                                 
15
 Hans Bader, New Mexico Court: Go Into Business, Lose your First Amendment Rights, COMPETITIVE 
ENTERPRISE INST. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2015 2:48 PM), https://cei.org/blog/new-mexico-court-go-business-lose-
your-first-amendment-rights/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
16
 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 
428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (“[Wooley] makes it clear that the right to speak freely includes the right to 
refrain from speaking.”).  
 
17
 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 
18
 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1283, 1349 (1996). 
 
19
 James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 966 (2011). 
20
 Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 1207. 
 
21
 App. A; states are listed alphabetically. Some states do not have Public Accommodation laws. 
  
22
 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
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overlooked in 1964, as demonstrated by Heart of Atlanta v. United States, but the 
creators of the Civil Rights Act knew there was no perfect solution and had to make a 
compromise.
23
 
     This thesis will briefly explain the history of these laws and will then discuss how they 
are applied today.  There is the potential that limitations to state public accommodation 
could help address the conflict between free expression and the body of Public 
Accommodation law. 
C. Conflict and Resolution 
     The conflict that is created between Public Accommodation law and the First 
Amendment has been addressed in legal scholarship in the past, and it is being revisited 
now because of the Elane case.
24
  The development of this conflict is explained in the 
State Action section of this thesis.  The arguments supporting both sides of the outcome 
in Elane are very strong.
25
  Some scholars, and the State of New Mexico, maintain that 
the Public Accommodation laws prevail over the First Amendment, and thus a private 
business owner must accommodate all customers (of protected classes).
26
  Other scholars 
argue that the Court got it wrong and that the protection of the First Amendment and 
forms of expression must outweigh our current protections of certain classes granted via 
                                                 
23
 See sources cited infra note 214. 
 
24
 Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 1207. 
 
25
 Bagenstos, supra note 8 at 1207, 1208. 
 
26
 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1781 (2014). 
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Public Accommodation law.
27
  This thesis will not attempt to solve the underlying civil 
rights conflict, but it will explore the acute setting of this argument, as specific to Elane.  
The thesis will also address libertarian, and corporate theory demonstrated in the outcome 
of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
28
 (“Hobby Lobby”) imploring an in-depth 
exploration of how its outcome can affect the current and future of state Public 
Accommodation laws.  
     Hobby Lobby is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided after Elane,
29
 
and it represents a vast step forward for the accommodation of religious rights.
30
  Hobby 
Lobby is not a case about Public Accommodation laws. It represents a conflict between 
two federal acts, the Affordable Care Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
31
  
What this conflict demonstrates is a potential way forward for providing First 
Amendment rights to business owners while strengthening religious freedoms and 
theories.
32
 The background and decision of Hobby Lobby will be discussed as one 
possible way of extending freedoms to individual business owners in the future.      
II. METHODOLOGY 
                                                 
27
 Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae: The Cato Institute, Prof. Dale Carpenter, and Prof. 
Eugene Volokh, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33-687), 2012 WL 
5990629 (N.M.). 
 
28
 See, supra note 11. 
 
29
 See Cato Institute Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27. 
 
30
 Horwitz, supra note 9, at 154.  
 
31
 See Horwitz, supra note 9. 
 
32
 See Bagenstos, supra note 8. 
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     The motivation for this thesis began in 2013.  I read a headline, “Go into business, 
lose your First Amendment rights”.33  I read this article and began using Westlaw to 
research Elane in its entirety.  Similarly, I created news and case alerts for Elane and 
since 2013 have been adding to my legal research. 
     The research prompted me to realize that though there was a lot of speculation and 
theoretical projection, there was substance missing.  I wanted to speak with the players 
involved.   
     My first attempt at an interview was with Dale Carpenter at the University’s Law 
School, as an amicus brief writer for the case, who led me to Ilya Shapiro, who had more 
hands on writing of the amicus brief.  While it was easy to interview persons who suggest 
the New Mexico Court ruled incorrectly it was not easy to interview those who felt the 
ruling was proper. 
     In drafting my interview questions for my interview participants, I wanted to ask 
similar questions to both “sides” of the argument, and get a greater understanding for the 
moment in time surrounding the actual case, arguments, and emotional setting in New 
Mexico.  I had five interviews tentatively scheduled, Ilya Shapiro, Jordan Lorence, 
Tobias Wolff, Sarah Steadman, and Julie Sakura. I also reached out to the ACLU and 
spoke with Micah McCoy who had written about Elane and was uninterested in 
contributing.  With these interviews scheduled I began my in-depth questioning of the 
same 10 questions, slated for a thirty to sixty minute interview. 
    Through many trials and tribulations, only two participants actually spoke with me.  
Sarah Steadman and Julie Sakura had to politely decline because Vanessa Willock 
                                                 
33
 See Bader, supra note 15. 
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thought the information was too sensitive to share.  Tobias Wolff was working a rigorous 
academic schedule and couldn’t meet the time frame.  Though my questions and solution 
were not posed or designed as one-sided, it was the hope of this author that both sides of 
the argument could have contributed to the legal and social research included. 
III. OVERVIEW 
A. Roadmap 
    Part I of this thesis is the summary of Elane’s progress through the court system, told 
through interviews, fact gathering, and legal research.  Part II begins with a literature 
review addressing the conflict between the First Amendment and Public Accommodation 
laws.  The conflict will be explained through an overview of the development of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, and theoretical applications of individual autonomy to Elane 
will be given in order to demonstrate the case’s significance.  The Civil Rights Act and 
Public Accommodation law jurisprudence will also be discussed, and social contract 
theory will be discussed as a background to the creation of the Civil Rights Act. The 
literature review will also discuss relevant scholarly works on the conflict between these 
bodies of law, specifically in New Mexico.  The thesis then turns to religious freedom 
and how the Hobby Lobby decision impacts Elane’s future societal impact.  
     Part III of this thesis builds on Part II by establishing research questions for discussion 
and analysis.  Part IV of the thesis is a presentation of results from the interviews and the 
literature review.  Part V concludes by demonstrating the importance of this research to 
other states’ interpretations of similar conflicts and offers potential avenues for future 
research. Before the thesis commences, an introduction to the interviewees is offered. 
  10 
1. Interviewees Introduction 
a. Jordan Lorence 
     Jordan Lorence (“Lorence”) represented Huguenin in his position as senior counsel for 
Alliance Defending Freedom.
34
  Lorence gives a first-hand account of receiving the case, 
his predictions at the time, and his opinion of the case today.  He explains his strategies 
and provides emotional reflections on his courtroom appearances.  His perspective is 
important to this thesis because of his integral role and his first person perspective within 
Elane. 
b. Ilya Shapiro 
     Ilya Shapiro (“Shapiro”) wrote in part on an amicus brief for Elane.35  He is a senior 
fellow at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank that functions as amici on many 
Supreme Court cases.  Shapiro focuses on the First Amendment and in his responses 
offers content applicable to the future of litigation surrounding individual Americans’ 
freedoms.  His interview provides a broader picture of the case, as he comes from a 
position of dealing with multiple similar cases.  Because his time is valuable, his role in 
this case and the considerable contributions he made to the amicus brief suggest the 
importance he saw in Elane. 
B. Interview Jordan Lawrence, Introduction to Elane 
     In 2009, Jordan Lorence was contacted by Huguenin, who was baffled by the 
discrimination charges that were being brought against her.
36
  Huguenin’s situation 
                                                 
34
 Telephone Interview with Jordan Lorence, Senior Counsel, Alliance Defending Freedom (Feb. 26, 2015). 
 
35
 Telephone Interview with Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute (Feb. 27, 2015). 
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represented a case that Lorence knew would be coming.
37
  With the ever growing 
movement for LGBTQ rights sweeping the United States, Lorence had forecasted in 
previous meetings at the Alliance that they would start seeing cases of this nature in the 
future.
38
  Lorence predicted situations worthy of any law school classroom, whereby a 
business owner with personal convictions and beliefs would be compelled to serve 
someone they wished to refuse.
39
  For example, Lorence imagined a hypothetical 
situation where a tattoo artist is asked to create a swastika for a customer and is 
compelled to do so by Public Accommodation laws.
40
  Though this scenario leaves out 
the legal necessity of the potential customer belonging to a protected class, such as 
LGBTQ persons, the same principle applies: A business owner is compelled by the 
government to express and communicate something she doesn’t believe in.  For Alliance 
Defending Freedom, Elane represented the concretization of Lorence’s hypotheticals.41 
     Ms. Huguenin’s case arrived at the Alliance as any other case does.  She reported that 
she was being charged with discrimination.
42
  Like many other civilians, she didn’t 
understand the legal intricacies of her case.
43
  She didn’t understand how it was possible 
                                                                                                                                                 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 Id. 
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 Id. 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 Id. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 Id. 
 
  12 
for her to be charged with discrimination when, not only was same-sex marriage against 
her personal beliefs, but the State of New Mexico itself didn’t recognize same-sex unions 
as legally valid.
44
  The Alliance contacted Lorence immediately.  The controversy he had 
predicted had arrived.  A Christian photographer had declined to photograph a same-sex 
ceremony and was being charged with discrimination.
45
 
     Lorence formulated a solid defense based around First Amendment rights and 
compelled speech. He felt assured they had strong arguments for Ms. Huguenin’s case 
against Ms. Willock.  But perhaps he should not have been so assuming.  As the case 
went through the courts, he found that his arguments were continually denied, and he was 
treated poorly and felt unwelcomed by the bench.  He described the atmosphere as tense 
and confusing and didn’t understand why his arguments weren’t prevailing. 
     As time passed, with the suit and the appeals, Huguenin was made to look like a 
villain in the New Mexican press.  Overwhelmingly, the public seemed to feel that 
Vanessa Willock did have the right to be served by Elane Photography.  Meanwhile, 
Huguenin was offered no public condolences to silence her expression that differed from 
the masses’.  
     Lorence reflected on a similar situation that was widely covered by the New Mexican 
popular media during the same time that Ms. Huguenin was receiving bad press.  Antonio 
Darden was a gay hairdresser who had for years been styling and coloring New Mexican 
Governor Susana Martinez’s hair.46  After Martinez commented publicly that she, like 
                                                 
44
 Id.. 
 
45
 Id. 
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Chris Christie in New Jersey, would vote against a bill legalizing gay marriage in New 
Mexico, Darden refused to continue being her hairdresser.  Darden gave interviews and 
made social media appearances in which he expressed his view and opinions of those 
who were opposed to gay marriage.
47
 He encouraged gay citizens and supporters of gay 
marriage to continue his precedent and not allow persons who didn’t support the cause to 
use the services they provided.
48
  Lorence asked, “How is this not discriminatory or 
viewed in a negative light, like Ms. Huguenin’s situation?”  Darden is quoted as saying, 
“I do believe we should be able to refuse the service. If our equal rights are being 
violated, I think I should refuse the service.”49 
     While Lorence did not claim it was the sole reason for the decision, he was convinced 
that the national movement for same-sex rights impacted the outcome of the case.  In the 
same New Mexican Supreme Court term, New Mexico voted to legalize same-sex 
marriage. 
     Although these soft factors may have influenced the case, what it came down to 
legally was a battle in which the Constitution lost.  Lorence stated that, in principle, the 
competing laws seek to achieve a harmonious goal.  States and the federal government 
put Public Accommodation laws in place for a true and good intention.  The author of 
this thesis as well as many commenters on the case agree that hoping for a different legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
46
 Sam Stein, Susana Martinez Hairstylist Troubles Prompted by Chris Christie Gay Marriage Veto, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/susana-martinez-hairstylist-
antonio-darden-chris-christie-gay-marriage_n_1300040.html. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 Id. 
 
49
 Telephone Interview with Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute (Feb. 27, 2015). 
  14 
outcome is not the same as making discrimination a goal or even desirable.  But the 
“goals versus the means” of the actual application of Public Accommodation laws 
becomes confounding. 
     Lorence’s interview adds to the case study methodology and overall writing about this 
case.  His contribution also legitimizes points of the conclusion and answering questions 
in this thesis.  His conclusion generally about Elane is the struggle he calls a “troubling 
absolutism”.  There isn’t an answer to all of the conflicts.  But the answer certainly 
doesn’t lie in compelling a person to speak against their convictions. 
C. Facts of Elane 
     In late 2006, Vanessa Willock emailed Elane Photography requesting services to 
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.
50
  The business of Elane Photography 
involved photographing the significant life events of its customers, events such as 
weddings, graduations, and celebrations.
51
  Elane Photography was co-owned by 
Jonathan Huguenin and Elaine Huguenin.
52
  The couple had been in business as a limited 
liability company in New Mexico since April 2006.
53
  Elane Photography’s business and 
contact information was advertised in multiple locations, including on their company 
                                                 
50
 Willock v. Elane Photography, Inc., HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 5 (N.M. Human Rights 
Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/files/willockopinion.pdf. 
 
51
 Id. at 2. 
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 Id. 
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website and in the Yellow Pages, and customers generally contacted Huguenin by email 
to request services.
54
  Huguenin and her husband were followers of a Christian faith.
55
   
     In the opening of this thesis, Huguenin’s response to Vanessa Willock was quoted 
further: “As a company, we photograph traditional weddings, engagements, seniors, and 
several other things such as political photographs and singer's portfolios.”56  This 
response prompted Vanessa Willock to believe she had been declined services and thus 
discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.
57
 
     Vanessa Willock, in an effort to confirm her suspicions, responded with an email 
asking if Elane Photography did not offer their services to same-sex couples.
58
  
Huguenin’s response—“Yes, you are correct in saying we do not photograph same-sex 
weddings, but again, thanks for checking out our site!”—led to the stirring controversy 
discussed in this thesis.
59
   
                                                 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d at 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 
56
 Elane, No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 5; Lorence interview, supra note 34. Huguenin saw and used no 
malice in this simple emailed response similar to other things her company was going to decide not to 
photograph she sat back and reflected and decided as an organization they would not photograph same-sex 
ceremonies. She also did not think this was a major issue because at that time, New Mexico did not legally 
recognize same-sex marriages as valid.  
 
57
 Lorence interview, supra note 34. Lorence relates that Elaine shot photos of LGBTQ persons. Elaine had 
also declined to photograph other things against her religion in the past in her business.  Specifically, her 
company made an artistic decision to not do any nude photos.  Elane was asked by a New Mexico mother 
to take newborn photos where the mother and the baby were nude.  Elane declined as she felt 
uncomfortable and did not see this as a message she wanted for the business.  
58
 Elane, No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 5. 
 
59
 Id. 
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     Vanessa Willock took one more step to confirm what she had suspected: that she had 
been discriminated against.
60
  Her partner sent an email to Huguenin two months after 
Vanessa Willock’s initial correspondence, requesting photography services for the same 
date and location but without describing the event as a same-sex.  In an email response, 
Huguenin confirmed her availability and willingness to offer her services.
61
     
     These events led Vanessa Willock to file a discrimination complaint with the Human 
Rights Commission (HRC), the first organization involved in the processing of such a 
complaint in the State of New Mexico.  After the result was returned in favor of Vanessa 
Willock, the complaint was turned into a legal case in which Elane Photography LLC 
was the plaintiff and Vanessa Willock the defendant.   
     Elane went on to the district court, the court of appeals, and finally the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico.  Each court found in favor of Vanessa Willock.  In the following 
sections, the progression of the case through these courts will be examined. The specific 
arguments made by these courts will be used in a later part of thesis, as the author makes 
an argument about the future of Public Accommodation laws.  It is particularly important 
to note where the courts start to discard certain arguments made by Lorence and what 
arguments the court values and focuses on.
62
 
1. Elane’s movement through justice System 
a. Human Rights Commission 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 7. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Lorence interview, supra note 34. 
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     The HRC of New Mexico met to review the discrimination complaint in 2006.
63
  The 
HRC decided in favor of Vanessa Willock on all three issues:  The first issue was that 
Vanessa Willock was discriminated against for her sexual orientation, in violation of 
Section 28-1-7(F) of the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA).
64
  The second issue 
was that Elane Photography, as a licensed business in New Mexico, was found to be a 
public accommodation; public accommodation is defined in Section 28-l-2(H) of the 
NMHRA as “any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, 
accommodations or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or 
other place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private...."
65
  The third 
issue was that Huguenin could not use her religious beliefs as a defense.  The arguments 
made by the HRC for these conclusions are written below. 
     The HRC said that the United States Constitution, the New Mexico Constitution, and 
the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act (NMRFRA), take precedence over 
the NMHRA are therefore not reviewed by the HRC.
66
  What the HRC meant is that 
deciding on the constitutionality of the NMHRA was outside of their authority, and 
therefore any claim of unconstitutionality would have to be heard in a court with 
jurisdiction over that particular issue.  It is central to the argument of this thesis that 
                                                 
63
 Elane, No. 06-12-20-0685, slip op. at 1. 
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 Id. at 10. 
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Constitutional issues must be discussed in order to find a fair ruling in such cases and to 
set correct future precedent.  Additionally, it should be noted, Vanessa Willock did 
follow proper procedure in the State of New Mexico by first bringing the case to the 
HRC.
67
  And the Constitutional issues that follow are the reason Huguenin becomes the 
plaintiff.   
     The HRC’s decision was reviewed in the district court on cross motions from both 
parties, meaning both parties made new claims against each other.
68
  Both parties wished 
to have summary judgment declared in their favor on the issues they presented in their 
motions.  Summary judgment meant the court found no dispute of facts and rules on the 
issues of law without a trial.  The details of the outcome of Elane in district court are 
below. 
b. District Court 
     This district court ruled on the four following issues:  The district court confirmed the 
HRC decision that Elane Photography was a public accommodation.  It also confirmed 
the HRC decision that the discrimination was based on sexual orientation.  Most 
importantly, it also ruled that the freedom of expression that is guaranteed to residents of 
New Mexico through the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution 
was not violated.
69
  And, finally, the court held that Elane Photography’s freedom of 
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 NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE, FILING A COMPLAINT OF DISCRIMINATION, 
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license plate motto, nor to alter its message, as in Hurley. Plaintiff's message is not and has never been 
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religion was superseded by statute, meaning their religious freedom did not equally 
counter New Mexico’s statute in their Human Rights Act against discrimination.70  The 
defendant, Vanessa Willock, prevailed on all issues. Below is a more detailed account of 
the reasoning. 
Public Accommodation classification 
     Lorence tried to argue that a photography business is not a public accommodation 
based on the fact that it does not occupy a physical space and was not one of the five 
types of accommodations listed in NMSA § 49-8-5 (1955).
71
  Lorence supported this 
argument by referencing Human Rights Comm’n of N.M. v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of 
N.M. College of Nursing, which listed hotels, other lodgings, restaurants, hospitals and 
clinics, places of entertainment, and common carriers as the original types of public 
accommodations and which the court previously had used as its precedent.
72
  The court 
disagreed with this argument, saying that photography’s being non-essential, comprising 
                                                                                                                                                 
about same-sex marriages. Rather, its message is fine photography of special moments. Unlike the parade, 
Plaintiff's final message is not its own. Instead, Plaintiff is conveying its client's message of a day well 
spent. As Defendant Willock states, Plaintiff is really a conduit or an agent for its clients. As such, the 
Court's finding that Plaintiff cannot refuse to photograph same-sex couples during a commitment ceremony 
is not an infringement of Plaintiff's right to freedom of expression”).  
70
  Id. at ¶¶ 27, 36 (“This case is not an example of religious persecution. Plaintiff and its owner-operator is 
not being forced to participate in any ceremony or ritual; the only requirement is that she photograph the 
event. This is no different from the caterer or florist attending the ceremony in order to provide its 
commercial service; they attend it, not participate in it . . . Plaintiff's religious beliefs, as a matter of law, do 
not over-ride New Mexico's compelling interest in combating discrimination”). 
71
 Id. at ¶ 7. The laws “[e]numerated in New Mexico's original HRA. See NMSA § 49-8-5 (1955) (the five 
basic categories included: hotels and other lodgings; restaurants and other places where food was sold for 
consumption on the premises; hospitals and clinics; places of entertainment; and common carriers). In 
Human Rights Comm'n of N.M. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. College of Nursing, 624 P.2d 518, 520 
(1981), the Court relied on the historical and traditional meanings of “public accommodation” (citation 
omitted).  
72
 Id. 
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artistic discretion, and not having a physical location were not worthy arguments against 
its classification as a public accommodation.
73
  The Huguenins’ nonessential service 
argument was shown to be irrelevant based on a previous case in which a dancing school 
was considered a public accommodation.
74
  Professional creativity and artistic discretion 
as arguments were not entertained by the court because this argument had no precedent at 
all.
75 
 And, with the advent of the internet and modern ways of doing business and 
commercial exchange, the physical location argument also did not hold weight for 
Lorence and Elane Photography.
76 
 Based on the evidence, the court found no genuine 
dispute of material fact, meaning summary judgment for Vanessa Willock was possible 
on this issue.  The court found Elane Photography was a public accommodation, per the 
NMHRA.
77
 
Discrimination based on sexual orientation 
     The court found Lorence’s argument that Elane Photography could not photograph 
same-sex ceremonies for religious reasons was without merit.
78
  The court found that 
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 See id. 
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 Id. at ¶ 8. The court references Crawford v. Robert L. Kent, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 620 (Mass. 1960), In re 
Johnson, 427 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1960), and Walston & Co., Inc. v. New York City Comm'n on Human 
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 Id. at ¶ 16 (responding to Plaintiff’s claim that “it would have photographed either Plaintiff or her 
partner, or even both, as long as it was not during their same-sex commitment ceremony itself”). 
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there was explicit unwritten company policy that excluded providing service to same-sex 
couples, and it determined that this was direct evidence of discrimination.
79
   
Freedom of expression 
     The court said the nondiscrimination laws that were in play did not violate the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The court used arguments from previous Supreme Court cases, 
described later in this thesis, to do so, conceptualizing the discrimination as action not 
speech
80
:  It was the action of discrimination, not the expression of speech, the laws 
addressed.  Thus, although the court said the New Mexico State Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution both protected freedom of expression from coercion by the state, it also 
ruled against Huguenin on this issue. The message or speech created by photography is 
not the photographer’s message, but rather belongs to the customer. The only thing a 
photographer has to do is take the photo.        
     The court was so sure of their position on this distinction of action versus expression 
that they used previous jurisprudence wherein photographs were declared speech and 
                                                 
79
 Id. (“Plaintiff states further that the ‘Company's policy [unwritten] allows Huguenin to photograph the 
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entitled First Amendment protection.
81
  They claimed that this declaration was “taken out 
of context.”82  The court said Elane Photography did not have a message of its own that 
could possibly be declared speech, thus there was nothing for the government to 
compel.
83
  The court declared Elane Photography was a conduit to convey the messages 
of its clients on particular “well spent” days.84  “As such, the Court's finding that Plaintiff 
cannot refuse to photograph same-sex couples during a commitment ceremony is not an 
infringement of Plaintiff's right to freedom of expression.”85 
Freedom of Religion 
     The fourth issue discussed in the case was the plaintiff’s freedom of religion.86  The 
court said that because Elane Photography was not being forced to participate in the 
ceremony, but rather to “merely photograph” it, that their rights were not being 
violated.
87
  The court used a case out of Alaska where a landlord with religious beliefs 
did not want to rent apartments to unmarried couples.
88
  Describing the facts in Elane as 
analogous to the Alaska case, the court held that the “[p]laintiff’s religious beliefs as a 
                                                 
81
 Id. at ¶ 19 (citing Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973) and Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 
689, 696 (2
nd
 Cir. 1996) (“Because such artistic expressions ‘communicate some idea or concept to those 
who view [them], they ‘are entitled to full First Amendment protection’” (quoting Bery))). 
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allowed to buy it”). 
 
83
 Id. at ¶ 25. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at ¶ 26. 
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 Id. at ¶ 34. 
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 Id. at ¶ 35 (citing Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994)). 
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matter of law, do not over-ride New Mexico’s compelling interest in combating 
discrimination.”89   
     Lorence used multiple arguments in this section of the case.  Included in his 
arguments was the concept of “hybrid rights.”90  This concept is only found in dicta of 
cases, not the actual ruling made by a court, only the discussion portion which is not 
controlling, and is not upheld by the Supreme Court.  Lorence’s final argument was to 
say the HRC must demonstrate a compelling state interest in the NMHRA to counter-
balance the burden it had placed on Huguenin.
91
  Lorence described their reply against 
this argument as “willful avoidance to acknowledge what is going on.”92  The “Free 
Exercise Inquiry” that Lorence was seeking ended with the court saying the following: 
At most, they have been directed to respect Defendant Willock's belief 
system and religious observation. They are not being asked to participate 
in the observation or to adopt - or even defend - Defendant's beliefs. They 
are merely being asked to photograph it, for an agreed fee in the ordinary 
course of their business.
93
 
     Additionally the court found that the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(NMRFRA) did not apply because a photography company is not a “person.”94  This 
finding is wildly relevant when considering the final outcome of Hobby Lobby.   
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c. Appeals Court 
     The case moved from the district court to the appeals court, where all previous 
arguments would be considered de novo, meaning the appeals court would look at all of 
the arguments and presented fact under their own jurisdiction and not base it off the facts 
found in the court below.
95
  Using different case law than the district trial court, different 
analogies and hypotheticals, the court of appeals was still unsatisfied with Lorence’s 
arguments.
96
  The court of appeals, like the district court, ruled on each issue in favor of 
Willock.
97
  
     The court considered the continual determination of Elane Photography as a public 
accommodation to be correct as a matter of law.
98
  What this decision demonstrated at the 
appeals court level was that the classification of a photography business as a Public 
Accommodation would going to stand.  The issue for businesses in New Mexico and 
other states as discussed in this thesis is, however, is whether this should be the 
classification.  
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     The debate over Public Accommodation classifications had made an appearance in 
previous cases in New Mexico.
99
  The legislative history of the Public Accommodation 
law in New Mexico has been described in depth in Regents.
100
  In this example, a 
university was deemed not a Public Accommodation in New Mexico because the 
modifications of the statute from an exclusive list to a broad statute were to still include 
original intentions of federal Public Accommodation laws that covered essential public 
services.
101
  The court in Regents made it known that its interpretation should be 
construed narrowly and was not to be applied in future situations not described.
102
  The 
Supreme Court in Elane therefore did not have to follow Regents’ interpretation and 
could have evaluated the statute differently suggesting the broad language was used on 
purpose by the legislature to cover services like that of Elane Photography and the 
legislature “ha[s] not recognized a special exception for nonessential, artistic or 
discretionary businesses.”103  This classification was considered final and “over broad” in 
the eyes of Shapiro.  The case moved to the Supreme Court of New Mexico.
104
  The 
classification as a public accommodation was largely what spelled disaster for Elane 
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Photography and is also where interpreting the Hobby Lobby decision can lead to an 
understanding of how to modify current Public Accommodation laws in order to avoid 
awkward rulings like this one.  
     The appeals court also made conclusions for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, freedom of expression, freedom of religious, and the constitutionality of the 
NMHRA.
105
  In Lorence’s opinion, none of his arguments was given adequate 
consideration, and he petitioned for certiorari in the New Mexico Supreme Court.  
Certiorari was granted, and Lorence continued defending Elane in front of what he 
described as “five, barely civil, supreme court justices.”106 
d. Supreme Court of New Mexico 
   In the New Mexico Supreme Court, the case was heard on only three issues.
107
 The 
argument that Elane Photography was not a public accommodation had been dropped by 
Lorence.  First, the court looked at whether Elane Photography had violated the NMHRA 
by not photographing Willock’s ceremony.108  Second, it decided if applying the 
NMHRA in this way violated free speech or the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.
109
  Third, the court determined if the NMHRA conflicted with the 
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NMRFRA.
110
  The court’s conclusions, which favored Vanessa Willock, are analyzed 
below. 
Discrimination based on sexual orientation 
     The court concluded that, “a commercial photography business that offers its services 
to the public, thereby increasing its visibility to potential clients, is subject to the 
antidiscrimination provision of the NMHRA and must serve same-sex couples on the 
same basis that is serves opposite sex couples.”111  Because the NMHRA protects sexual 
orientation, the court denied Lorence’s argument that Elane Photography would have 
photographed a gay person, just not a same-sex ceremony.  The court interpreted the 
NMHRA broadly, saying that discrimination made directly or indirectly is still 
discrimination.
112
  The court relied on Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University 
of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, where the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that targeting gay conduct versus a gay person was not a distinction 
that could protect against discrimination.
113
 It thus concluded that Elane Photography had 
violated the NMHRA.
114
 
Free speech guarantees 
                                                 
110
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     Secondly, the court concluded that “the NMHRA does not violate free speech 
guarantees because the NMHRA does not compel Elane Photography to either speak a 
government-mandated message or to publish the speech of another.”115  Two Supreme 
Court cases reigned throughout the discussion: Wooley and Hurley.
116
 Lorence used 
reasoning from Hurley to suggest that speech had been compelled, and the court used 
Wooley and Hurley to contradict Lorence’s argument.  The court interpreted Wooley and 
Hurley to be very narrowly tailored to “speaking the government’s message”117 and said 
the “NMHRA act does not require Elane Photography to recite or display any message.” 
The court emphasized this by saying “[i]t does not even require Elane Photography to 
take photographs.”118  The court declared that if the Huguenins wanted to have a 
photography business, they simply cannot discriminate against potential clients based on 
their sexual orientation.
119
  It goes without saying that operating a photography business 
without taking photos is blatantly counterintuitive. 
     Additionally because photography is the line of business Huguenin is in; and she 
wishes to collect revenue, she, like Annie Lebowitz, would be considered a public 
accommodation and would have to be available to be hired by any client to do the 
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work.
120
  The court distinguished Elane from Hurley by noting that Elane Photography 
sold its services to the public.  This argument develops to say that Elane Photography is 
not in business of photography, but simply a public accommodation and because the 
photographs are not distributed publicly and the speech is not being chilled. Meaning the 
effect this has on Huguenin would not interfere with her motivation to become a 
photographer simply because she has to photograph the LGBTQ community.  Because it 
would not interfere with Huguenin’s motivation, the court argues, the government is not 
commandeering any editorial choices of the speech, only that as a public accommodation 
all potential clients must be served.
121
   
     The court additionally suggested that Elane Photography’s taking of these photos 
would not lead to the assumption that they supported same-sex marriage.  The court 
claimed the following: “It is well known to the public that wedding photographers are 
hired by paying customers and that a photographer may not share the happy couple's 
views on issues ranging from the minor (the color scheme, the hors d'oeuvres) to the 
decidedly major (the religious service, the choice of bride or groom).”122  And if Elane 
Photography wanted to alleviate the concern of someone thinking they supported same-
sex marriage, Huguenin’s business was welcome to put a message on their website saying 
they opposed same-sex marriage but do comply with all New Mexico law including 
Public Accommodation laws.
123
  This was the court’s proposed solution to Elane 
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Photography’s dilemma, suggesting that customer’s could interpret Huguenin’s faith in 
their own way and choose or not choose to use her services.  The court was unwilling to 
hear Lorence’s arguments suggesting that there was a potential to solve the problem by 
narrowing the law because the Supreme Court was not arguing on this issue particularly, 
like the lower courts.   
     This issue was the focus of Shapiro’s amicus brief in the case.  Even if Shapiro thinks 
the court misinterpreted Wooley and Hurley in 2008, there is time and space in 
constitutional law right now to create a new genre of Public Accommodations.
124
  
Shapiro stated “there are less restrictive means to achieve the goals of Public 
Accommodation.”125  The goals will be discussed in the literature review.  The suggested 
approach in the amici brief is to narrow Public Accommodation laws or give them a 
caveat exempting “expressive” businesses from being classified as Public 
Accommodations.
126
 
    There is no precedent in New Mexico distinguishing “expressive” or “creative” 
businesses and granting them the ability to decline to abide by Public Accommodation 
laws, and the New Mexico Supreme Court was reluctant to use this as an opportunity to 
create that genre.  The court used King v. Spalding as an example in which a law firm, 
under Title VII, tried to not hire a person of a protected class because their business had 
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creative and expressive tendencies.
127
  Giving a broad interpretation and suggesting that 
any business could make an argument that it has creative and expressive tendencies, the 
court followed the United State Supreme Court’s ruling in King and did not give merit to 
Elane Photography’s argument.  The court then addressed the rights of Huguenin specific 
to their religion and freedom of expression through this vein. 
NMHRA Conflicts 
     Lastly, the court declared that the NMHRA did not violate the NMRFRA because the 
NMRFRA is not applicable between private party suits.
128
 This was described by Shapiro 
as an opinion that would produce bizarre results.
129
  The possibility of irregular and 
misinterpreted future expressions of speech by business owners was a concern for the 
outcome of the New Mexico Supreme Court and other states in similar circumstances.
130
  
New Mexico’s unique position as a state with a Religious Freedom Restoration Act that 
is in addition to the Federal Act is explained in the conclusion of this thesis.  
e. Petition for Certiorari, United States Supreme Court 
 
      On November 8, 2013, in response to losing his case in the New Mexico Supreme 
Court, Lorence petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
131
  The question 
presented to the Court was “[w]hether applying a state public-accommodations statute to 
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require a photographer to create expressive images and picture-books conveying 
messages that conflict with her religious beliefs violates the First Amendment's ban on 
compelled speech.”132  The Court’s response was delayed multiple times, but they finally 
decided they would hear the case on April 7, 2014, nearly eight years after the initial 
incident.
133
 
     After filing for certiorari, amicus briefs were filed in support of Elane Photography’s 
efforts to create a specific niche for expressive business.  The briefs included amici: 
Wedding Photographers, Cato Institute, Alabama, et al.
134
  Each brief considered the New 
Mexico decision and its application to current and future lawmaking, in light of what had 
happened to Elane Photography.  
     The Wedding Photographers’ amicus brief represented eighteen photojournalists in the 
United States.
135
  After describing their support of Elane Photography’s arguments 
throughout the case in New Mexico, they added the following: “[W]e focus on the 
threshold constitutional issue: photojournalistic wedding photography constitutes 
expression under the First Amendment; it is pure speech—influential and powerful in that 
it proclaims stories that mere words cannot; and it is the photographer’s speech even 
when the photographer is being paid to take the photographs.”136  With this idea they 
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petition the court to “hold that the First Amendment protect[] photographers like 
[Huguenin] from being compelled to speak as a condition for participating in the 
marketplace.”137  In other words, no matter what state law these professionals have 
conceded to by accepting payment for their craft, since photography is speech, it should 
not be compelled, even in the marketplace. 
     The Cato Institute filed a brief that went on to explain the practical realities of what 
would happen if expressive businesses were allowed to operate without having their 
speech compelled: it was likely those affected would simply choose another means of 
investing in the marketplace.
138
 
     Some states, including Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Virginia, also filed a brief, to recognize “the potential for conflict 
between first-amendment principles and public-accommodation laws.”139  The states refer 
to Barnett, a challenge that New Mexico had lost sight of when considering 
Constitutional rights.
140
  The states asked the court to use Elane to “reinforce the 
principle that the First Amendment protects the right to speak or not speak, even when 
the topic is politically and culturally divisive.”141  Driving the point home on the crucial 
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and important role of the Supreme Court hearing Elane, the states in their amicus brief 
say “[i]n fact that is precisely where the First Amendment’s protections are needed the 
most.”142   
     The arguments presented by Elane Photography and its three amici were not enough to 
convince the United States Supreme Court to hear the case.  But, in the same term, the 
Court did issue a major decision on a related case: Hobby Lobby.
143
   Lorence thought the 
Supreme Court probably gave Elane great consideration, but ended up choosing Hobby 
Lobby instead.
144
  In light of the Hobby Lobby decision, it is worthwhile to explore Elane 
further and determine a best plan for LLC owners currently and in the future. 
D. Ilya Shapiro Interview and Elane wrap up 
     Ilya Shapiro, a member of a libertarian think tank, was a contributor to the amicus 
brief written on behalf of Elane.  The brief mainly focused on the fact that Public 
Accommodation laws as currently written were too broad.  In most states, the laws 
(Appendix A) encompass most if not all businesses.  What the brief addressed is the 
parallel fact pattern of Elane and Wooley, similar cases that have different outcomes 
involving compelled speech. 
     The brief fights for a “solution” to a problem particularly relevant to what Shapiro 
calls “the next frontier” of First Amendment cases.  The brief argues for limiting Public 
Accommodation laws so as to narrow their scope to their original intentions.  A Public 
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Accommodation law should be enforced when an accommodation is necessary to serving 
the public.  The brief suggest creating a loophole in Public Accommodation laws for 
what are called expressive businesses.  Shapiro identifies multiple types of businesses 
that could be included in this category: writers, artists, and photographers.  In his 
interview, Shapiro said he understood the intent of the laws, but that the goals could be 
achieved by less restrictive means.  There are easier alternatives than going after artists 
for discrimination claims. 
     When asked what business owners should do in the meantime, Shapiro said, “Consult 
your lawyers.”  In the author’s opinion, this is true and is the safest means of protecting 
your personal and professional interests.  They are unaware when they may have violated 
someone else’s rights.  The laws disproportionately protect business owners and 
consumers alike. 
IV: LITERATURE REVIEW, PRIMARY 
A. Federalism  
     The division of authority between the national government and the state governments 
is called federalism.
145
  The general concept is that there are some powers actionable by 
the federal government alone, some by the states alone, and some that are actionable by 
both.  States, for example, play a prominent role in the selection of the president, and they 
approve Constitutional amendments.
146
  Through their various institutions such as taxes, 
criminal law, the education system, local governments, and social issues, states exert 
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power over many Americans’ everyday lives, within Constitutional limits.147  State 
lawmaking within Constitutional limits creates state action.  
1. State Action 
     The text of the original Constitution unambiguously establishes that it is a law 
governing government, not individuals.
148
 The First Amendment states that “Congress 
shall make no law.”149  This phrasing suggests that private actors can’t violate the 
Constitution; state action is what violates individual rights.  And by that violation the 
state can be acting unconstitutionally.  The way the judicial system uses the concept is as 
follows: 
It is the tool with which the courts attempt to balance at least three 
competing interests: (1) individual autonomy—the individual’s interest in 
preserving broad areas of life in which he or she can develop and act 
without being subjected to the restraints placed by the Constitution on 
governmental action, (2) federalism—the nation’s interest in preserving 
the proper balance between state and national power, especially the power 
of states to determine, within generous limits, the extent to which 
regulatory power should be applied to private action, and (3) constitutional 
rights—the interest in protecting constitutional rights against invasion by 
government or by action fairly attributable to government.
150
 
 
With this definition in mind, it is important to draw out two particulars. First, state action 
is a balancing act.  Since there are always competing values, it is unlikely that there 
                                                 
147
 Casey James-Michael Carmody, Political Culture, Policy Liberalism, and the Strength of Journalist's 
Privilege in the States (2013), accessible at http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/243. 
 
148
 Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1379, 1382 (2006). 
149
 U. S. CONST. amend. 1. 
 
150
 G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental 
Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 339-40 (1997). 
 
  37 
would ever be a perfect solution for individual autonomy.  Second, state action takes 
places between the government and an individual, not between two individuals. 
B. First Amendment Jurisprudence 
1. Theory     
 “The United States stands alone, even among democracies, in the extraordinary 
degree to which its Constitution protects freedom of speech.”151  The First Amendment 
has a level of protection that is greater than most other laws governing individual 
interests.
152
 This special protection is given to provide for a means of democracy.
153
  
Various Supreme Court cases have validated this special protection.
154
  
      Multiple theories surround the First Amendment: marketplace theory, self-
government theory, checking-value theory, dissent, tolerance, and individual 
autonomy.
155
  Each theory has been important for the philosophical development of 
Constitutional rights.
156
  But for this thesis and its First Amendment implications, the 
author has chosen to focus on individual autonomy theory. 
a. Individual autonomy theory 
     This theory that demonstrates the expansive role of the First Amendment holds the 
following: “[F]ree speech is an important component of individual liberty, regardless of 
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its products.”157  As Ronald Dworkin claims, liberty and freedom are measured by an 
individual’s ability to listen to other actors, including the government, and to form his or 
her own opinions; conversely, this also liberty refers to the individual’s ability to speak 
and communicate his or her own views, no matter how offensive they may be.
158
  But to 
understand individual autonomy it must be understood where liberty comes from.  
Vincent Blasi analyzes the value of liberty and why speech can be separated from other 
human desires.  He concludes, with reference to individual autonomy, that  
even if speech activities cannot persuasively be distinguished from many 
other claims of liberty on the ground of respect for the essence of the 
individual self, the fact remains that those aspects of liberty that involve 
speech receive the most explicit endorsement in the text of the 
Constitution and for that reason alone may properly be singled out for 
special judicial protection.
159
 
  
This protection is offered because citizens, without the ability to maintain a separate 
viewpoint, would “cease to be individuals.”160   
     Similarly, C. Edwin Baker has developed what he calls “liberty theory.”161  The theory 
seeks to protect non-coercive expressive activities, which operate through the free 
acceptance of such activities by a listener
162
: “The liberty model hold that the free speech 
clause protects not a marketplace, but rather an arena of individual liberty from certain 
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types of governmental restriction.  Speech or self-expressive conduct is protected not as a 
means to achieve a collective good but because of its value to this individual.”163 
     Liberty and individual autonomy, granted to individuals regardless of what products 
might arise from these privileges, lead to freedom of expression.   
2. Freedom of Expression    
     Freedom of expression, as a system in society, has four key tenets
164
: 
First, Freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual 
self-fulfillment.  Second, Freedom of expression is an essential process for 
advancing knowledge and discovering truth.  Third, Freedom of 
expression is essential to provide for participation in decision making by 
all members of society.  Finally, freedom of expression is a method of 
achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of 
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and 
necessary consensus.
165
  
 
     The practical application of freedom of expression creates a challenging environment 
in which multiple individual interests must be balanced.  
The doctrine of freedom of expression is generally thought to single out a 
class of “protected acts” which it holds to be immune from restrictions to 
which other acts are subject. In particular, on any very strong version of 
the doctrine there will be cases where protected acts are held to be 
immune from restriction despite the fact that they have as consequences 
harms which would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of 
legal sanctions.
166 
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Freedom of expression is a foundation for the development of individuals.  “The crux of 
the problem is that the limitations whatever they may be must be applied by one group of 
human beings to other human beings.”167  As demonstrated in Elane, “[t]he members of 
society must be willing to sacrifice individual and short term advantage for social and 
long range goals.”168  Thus, putting one group ahead of another is inevitable in this 
balancing act, but later on the author will discuss two groups applicable to Elane that 
evoke a non-political response.
169
  The cases discussed in the following section represent 
milestones in First Amendment precedent that are related to the Elane case. 
3. Jurisprudence Timeline 
     The development of First Amendment interpretations can be narrowly viewed for the 
purposes of this thesis.
170
  The cases below were used as foundational arguments in 
Elane. Some of these cases demonstrate the protection of a certain type of expression.  
For example, West Va. State Bd. Of Ed. v. Barnette, in 1943, and Wooley v. Maynard, in 
1977, both demonstrated that speech protection extends to the ability to refrain from 
speaking; in other words, being compelled to speak.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees—a 
Minnesota case used by defendant Vanessa Willock’s attorneys—said the national men’s 
group chapter could not discriminate against women because the group had no message 
has been distinguished sixteen years later by Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, which allowed a 
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group to discriminate in order to protect its message.  Finally, Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston (“Hurley”), exemplified an exact conflict of First 
Amendment rights with a state’s Public Accommodation laws.  
     Each of these cases are useful in understanding the arguments made by the courts in 
Elane.  The generalities and legal conclusions from these cases form our contemporary 
understanding of First Amendment protection.   
1943 – Pledge of Allegiance  
West Va. State Bd. Of Ed. v. Barnette 
     This case concerned a group of students in West Virginia who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.  They did not want to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance activities in their 
school, activities which were required by law.
171
  The United States Supreme Court 
declared the Pledge of Allegiance a form of expression.
172
  This case represented the idea 
of compelled speech, and the Court devised an analytical test to evaluate whether a given 
expression was being compelled by the government:  
First analyze whether a law has the effect of eliciting some sort of 
expression, then decide whether the expression amounts to a “declaration” 
or “affirmation” of belief. If there are sanctions for noncompliance with 
the statute, an impermissible compulsion will be found and will possibly 
be an even greater First Amendment harm than a restriction of speech.
173
 
 
1977 – License plate motto 
Wooley v. Maynard  
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     Wooley came before the Court thirty-four years after the test developed in Barnette.  
The case concerned a couple, the Maynards, who were living in New Hampshire, in 
1974.  At the time, New Hampshire license plates displayed the state motto “live free or 
die.”174  Mr. Maynard and his wife, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses,175 chose to cover up 
the “live free or die” text on their license plates.176  Mr. Maynard was subsequently 
charged multiple times with misdemeanors, because it was against NH 262:27 “[to] 
knowingly obscure…the figures or letters on any plate.”177  Mr. Maynard served jail time 
for his offense and was charged a fine.
178
  After litigation and trials, the Maynards 
brought action for an injunction against enforcing the charges of the misdemeanor 
because it was unconstitutional.
179
  The court said, “[w]e begin with the proposition that 
the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action 
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”180   
     Mr. Maynard’s success in the case can be summed up by the Court’s opinion that 
“where the state’s interest is to disseminate an ideology no matter how acceptable to 
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid 
                                                 
174
 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 
175
 Id. at 1431. 
 
176
 Id.  
 
177
 Id. 
 
178
 Id. at 1432. 
 
179
 Id. 
 
180
 Id. at 1435. 
 
  43 
becoming the courier for such message.”181  This statement by the Court is frequently 
cited to demonstrate the compelled speech concept.  The Court was aware of the 
similarities similar Wooley and Barnette,
182
 and it employed Barnette to determine that 
“[…] the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state 
motto upon their vehicle license plates”.183  Both Lorence and Shapiro exclaimed in their 
interviews that Elane was analogous to Wooley.
184
  Elane drew on the exact premise of 
Wooley in that a state was compelling one of its actors to speak against her beliefs. 
1984 – Excluding female members 
Roberts v U.S. Jaycees 
     As opposed to referencing Wooley, Vanessa Willock’s attorneys likened the facts of 
Elane to Roberts.  A case out of Minnesota, Roberts concerned a national organization, 
the Jaycees,
185
 that was males-only.
186
  The Minnesota chapter was taken to court for not 
allowing female members to become part of the organization.
187
  The Court held that 
because the women’s being part of the organization did not alter the organization’s 
message, they must be allowed to join.
188
  Vanessa Willock’s attorney used this case to 
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demonstrate that the Court likes to eliminate irrational discrimination.
189
  Roberts was 
distinguished in 2000 by Dale, which demonstrates the contemporary protection offered 
to free speech even in the delicate social climate of protecting gay citizens. 
1995 – Altering expressive content of parade violates First Amendment 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston 
     Hurley was about a private parade in Massachusetts.
190
  The parade through Boston 
was an annual event of local comradery.
 
 The Supreme Court ruled the Public 
Accommodation law of Massachusetts unconstitutional as related to this parade.
191
  A 
group called the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) wanted to 
participate in the parade but its members were denied.
192 
 The group brought suit. The 
Supreme Court determined that the parade was a form of expression.
193  
The Court found 
that even though the parade did not have a specific message to convey, the expression 
was still protected.
194  
The Court distinguished the case from Roberts and did not accept 
the petitioners’ argument that the parade was a conduit.195  Therefore, those in charge of 
the parade were legally allowed to exclude the participation of GLIB members.
196
  The 
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most important outcome of Hurley is a two-prong test the Court designed to determine 
what types of messages or expression must receive First Amendment protection.
197 
 Like 
Elane is considered a public accommodation, with or without a specific message to 
convey the business should not be considered only a conduit of a message.  Hurley is the 
next to last case relevant to the First Amendment discussion influential to understanding 
Elane. This section of the thesis concludes with discussing Dale. 
2000 – Violation of Expressive Association 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale 
     Dale was a case that presented the tension between equality and freedom.
198
  The Boy 
Scouts of America was a non-profit organization whose mission is to instill a system of 
values in young men.
199
  James Dale was a scout leader who moved through the ranks of 
the Boy Scouts and as an adult became a Scout Leader.  When Dale went to college, he 
became active in advocating for gay rights.
200
  Dale sued the Boy Scouts after he was 
terminated from his position for being gay.
201
  New Jersey, where Dale lived, prevents 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.
202
  However, the Court held that the 
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Boy Scouts’ expression was protected by the First Amendment203  and determined that 
Dale’s existence in the organization was a disruption to this expression.204  Like in 
Hurley, the Court cited the “severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ right to freedom of 
expressive association.”205  Dale overruled the idea contained in Roberts. That the 
Supreme Court now holds expressive association as a value bodes well for the possibility 
of interpreting Elane under similar terms. 
Paid Photography as speech 
     There is not a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court that addresses a 
photographer’s First Amendment rights,206 but there is a test for determining whether an 
action deserves First Amendment protection.
207
  The test from Hurley is as follows: “To 
achieve First Amendment protection, a plaintiff must show that he possessed: (1) a 
message to be communicated; and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of 
the medium in which the message is to be expressed.”  The audience requirement of the 
second prong of the test is what ruled out First Amendment protection for private 
recreational photography.
208
 
     A Supreme Court determination of photography, stated in black letter law, does not 
exist. However, there was a relevant reference to the United States Court of Appeals, in 
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the Second Circuit, when Elane was in front of the appeals court of New Mexico.  The 
reference says 
The district court seems to have equated the visual expression involved in 
these cases with the crafts of the jeweler, the potter and the silversmith 
who seek to sell their work. While these objects may at times have 
expressive content, paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures, such as 
those appellants seek to display and sell in public areas of the City, always 
communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, and as such are 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.
209
 
 
     To go beyond the general classification of photos as speech, it is important to 
understand that as a wedding photographer Huguenin was not just clicking the photo and 
handing it off to her customer.  Huguenin was contributing hours of editorial critique and 
spending time developing thoughtful images for her customers.  Since photographs pass 
the test in Hurley for first amendment protection, it would be difficult to suggest that the 
court is not eliciting a form of expression. 
 Summary 
     Though Elane did not make it to the Supreme Court, its conflict is no doubt 
representative of the types of conflicts that are ruled on by the Court.  Historically, the 
Court has determined what speech is, who can speak it, who doesn’t have to speak it, and 
what type of organization can be considered expressive, but it also clear that there is no 
black and white determination.  As society and the marketplace change, it becomes easy 
to see why cases like Elane are central to solving future conflicts.  It is with this line of 
precedent in mind that the thesis will now attempt to illustrate Public Accommodation 
laws in a logical manner. 
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C. Public Accommodation 
1. Federal History & Civil Rights Act of 1964 
     In 1954, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education was heard in the Supreme 
Court.
210
  The holding in this case overturned the previous landmark legislation of racial 
segregation in education, Plessy v. Ferguson.
211
 The holding in Brown revoked the 
concept of “separate but equal” in reference to the racial segregation of the school system 
from Plessy.
212
  Similarly, the Court said racial segregation violated the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
213
   
     This Supreme Court decision inspired a wave of civil rights actions in the United 
States during the 1960s that ultimately led to the creation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
spearheaded by Hubert Humphrey.
214
  The legislation was met with criticism, a filibuster, 
and lengthy audits, before it was finally enacted.
215
 
2. Purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 & Title II (Public Accommodation) 
     “The purpose of [The Civil Rights Act] is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary 
settlement of the persistent problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation 
by establishments doing business with the general public, and by labor unions and 
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professional, business, and trade associations.”216  This purpose was qualified by passage 
in the Senate.
217
 The Senate read the bill before it was to “eliminate discrimination in 
public accommodations affecting interstate commerce.”218  The clause that represented 
public accommodation and interstate commerce, under Title II, was the gateway for the 
federal act to have preemption over state action.  This concept was immediately 
challenged in another Supreme Court case in 1964, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc., v United 
States, which challenged Congress’s power to make such a law.219   
     Heart of Atlanta was a case where a 216-room hotel in Atlanta refused to serve black 
guests.
220
  The owner claimed the Act violated his fifth and thirteenth amendment 
rights.
221
  The Supreme Court ruled that Congress was well within its means to enact 
Title II of the Act based on their authority under the interstate commerce clause.
222
  It 
must be noted that the federal Act only offers injunctive relief, not damages, as with 
some state claims.
223
 
3. Influence of Hobby Lobby decision 
a. Facts 
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Hobby Lobby is a “religious” case that is rooted in different bodies of law, many of 
which are not discussed in this thesis. However, although its legal conclusion remains 
extremely narrow, there are simple points that can be taken from its decision that are 
applicable to Elane.
224
  Though the rule of law that is established in this case by the 
Supreme Court is minute, as a principle and implication for further litigation and 
legislation it is hugely important.  The conflict of Hobby Lobby was set up with the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act.
225
   
     The Affordable Care Act contained a clause stating that medical services, including 
certain forms of birth control, must be offered to employees by their employers.
226
  
Hobby Lobby maintained a religious identity, and its owners held certain convictions that 
prevented them from believing in certain forms of birth control.
227
  Their refusal to 
provide birth control to their employees prompted a lawsuit.
228
 
b. Holding 
     The holding of the case permitted Hobby Lobby to not offer birth control to its 
employees.
229
  Hobby Lobby “carved out” a part of the federal act, which is to say that 
some corporations, because of their religious affiliation, no longer have to follow a 
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portion of the mandate.
230
  Met with overwhelming societal, media, and scholarly 
attention, Hobby Lobby represented multiple conclusions.
231
  Reinforcing the legal 
precedent that corporations are “people” and thereby allowed to have an identity, Hobby 
Lobby is and will be greatly influential in other cases related to business and religion.
232
   
c. Connection to Elane 
     Hobby Lobby is important to Elane for multiple reasons, primarily for what it 
represents theoretically, but also for its practical, libertarian implications.  Lorence saw 
the Court granting certiorari to Hobby Lobby as positive for the rights of people like 
Huguenin.
233
   Additionally, Justice Ginsburg, in a lengthy and socialized dissent against 
the ruling of Hobby Lobby, mentioned the Elane case.
234
  Hobby Lobby and Elane stood 
for different mechanisms and outcomes concerning the breadth of religion in business, 
but both have been influential to the future.
235
  Discussed in depth in the interviews and 
conclusion of this thesis, the facts are different from Elane, but there is potential positive 
movement underway anytime a civil rights conflict is decided by the Supreme Court. 
D. Libertarian Theory 
A government cannot have too much of the kind of authority which does 
not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development.  
The mischief  begins when, instead of calling fort the activity and powers 
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of individuals and bodies, it substitutes it own activity for theirs, when, 
instead of informing, advising, and, upon occasion, denouncing , it makes 
them work in fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead 
of them.  The worth of a state in the long run, is the worth of the 
individuals composing it.
236
 
 
     Libertarian theory, although it is derived from multiple sources, can be summarized as 
“a spectrum of political philosophies, all sharing a general presumption of liberty.”237 The 
John Stuart Mill quote opening this section describes more of the thought as it applies to 
state government and Elane.  In introducing Libertarianism as a theoretical concept in 
this thesis its place is to demonstrate the reach of liberty beyond First Amendment 
construction and see its spawn into multiple disciplines.  In the discussion of Hobby 
Lobby, libertarian perspectives can be used to convey the principles in the Supreme 
Court’s decision.238  Libertarianism represents a very relevant body of thought for readers 
of this thesis and future business owners.  
V. LITERATURE REVIEW, SECONDARY 
A. Public Accommodation 
     In 1968, Alfred Avins described his view of the intentions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, specifically concerning the difference between public and private 
accommodations.
239
  He focused on how to govern in these circumstances as well as the 
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logic behind the difference.
240
  By examining the American adoption of public 
accommodations from England, his article also helps explain why states adopted the 
categories they did.  In England, for example, an inn was a public accommodation, 
whereas a coffee shop was not.
241
  Avins concluded that America drew examples from 
England as well as its own civil war and pointed out how, as a result, the Act was 
confusing with respect to common law and state authority. 
     Citing examples from case law from the 1800s and early 1900s, Avins demonstrated 
that, via common law, anti-discrimination protection had already been happening.
242
  The 
enactment of the Act was therefore in a way only reinforcing what had already been 
happening.  Avins cited Justice Holmes and his 1916 opinion in Terminal Taxi Cab to 
support his conclusion that business types should be distinguished within the Act:  
It is true that all business, and, for the matter of that, every life in all its 
details, has a public aspect, some bearing upon the welfare of the 
community in which it is passed. But, however it may have been in earlier 
days as to the common callings, it is assumed in our time that an invitation 
to the public to buy does not necessarily entail an obligation to sell. It is 
assumed that an ordinary shopkeeper may refuse his wares arbitrarily to a 
customer whom he dislikes, and although that consideration is not 
conclusive, it is assumed that such a calling is not public as the word is 
used.
243
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     Avins also quoted Holmes in regard to distinguishing one business from another, 
claiming that “the result is an incomparable crazy quilt without rhyme or reason.”244  He 
concluded his article by suggesting that in 1968, the Public Accommodation laws were in 
a state of confusion.
245
  Avins attempted to distinguish three categories of business: tax-
supported government facilities, public utilities, and economic or natural monopolies.
246
  
In his conclusion, he also questioned whether labels needed to be placed on public 
accommodations.
247
  His closing remarks suggested that something as irresistible as 
freedom of choice will always find loopholes in the laws damming up the system.
248
 
     What does this mean for states? It could mean there is no rhyme or reason as to how 
states have adopted their own laws.  It could mean that states look to their statutory 
systems and common law interpretations to further their autonomous position in the 
union.   
     Most importantly, Alfred Avins taught that this great problem has no theoretical 
undercurrent.  Discussed by Nan Hunter’s takeaway is the following:  
Thus, in the broader discourse of whether law should be enlisted in the 
effort to strengthen civil society, issues of public accommodations and 
expressive association inevitably arise. Given this degree of significance, 
it is especially unfortunate that the law has never developed a theory 
of public accommodations. As a 1968 article [Avins] focused only on 
commercial entities concluded, “There is no underlying rationale which 
distinguishes private businesses from public businesses. Legislatures and 
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courts have chosen to lump together whatever businesses they think ought 
to serve [a given group], without developing any clear-cut theory to justify 
such inclusions or exclusions.” As a result, there is great variance in the 
definitions of what constitutes a public accommodation.
249
 
 
     The problem of discrimination has plagued law makers and societies for hundreds of 
years, and it seems there can be no ultimate solution. Rather, the inevitable outcome of 
lawmaking in society is that some members feel indignity from being discriminated 
against.  State laws and their adoptions are discussed below. 
1. State Level Public Accommodation 
     Almost all states have extremely broad and encompassing public accommodation 
laws.
250
  Most states use language similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
251
  The Act 
explicitly referred to businesses engaged in interstate commerce, which generally means 
those involved in food, consumption, gasoline, or entertainment, and excluded private 
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businesses.
252
  The widespread use of the federal act as a model for such laws does not 
explain why many states have gone further and broadened the language of their laws so 
as to refer to any business type in their state.  Some states have relied so heavily on the 
federal act that they have no statute of their own. 
     There are over 25 states, including the District of Columbia, with statutes that contain 
a specific list of businesses that count as public accommodations, but also add in a 
caveat.
253
  The caveat states that an encompassing ability is “accepting any form of 
payment from the public.”  This type of phrase is used by Colorado, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota.  There are also states that make exhaustive lists of businesses that will be 
classified as public accommodations. Examples of businesses included on such lists are 
stores, banks, medical or dental offices, government agencies, hair salons, hospitals, 
hotels, theaters, restaurants, schools, and taxis.   
     Building on Avins, Hunter writes in part in her article focusing on categories of what 
states have classified as public accommodations and tries to pair state law creation 
timelines in sync with civil rights movements while using the market model as a societal 
theory.
254
  She concludes by saying “[t]he end result was a doctrinal hangover from the 
civil versus social rights ideology that Congress could not cure because of the Civil 
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Rights Cases and that the Supreme Court has never repudiated”255  With her 
interpretation of the current setting as a “doctrinal hangover,” Hunter applies Habermas 
and the social citizenship model to Public Accommodation laws.
256
   
“In both their historical context and in contemporary social theory, they 
resonate most powerfully with concepts of full participatory membership 
in those venues that undertake to generate, in a broadly open and highly 
unselective way, norms of citizenship. Habermas's concept of the public 
sphere provides, at the least, a theoretical starting point for developing that 
conceptualization.”257 
    Her article concludes by refuting the arguments in Dale and simultaneously refuting 
the arguments made by Shapiro.
258
  Her suggestion is to focus not on altering the laws for 
the benefit of the business owner, but on how a business’s accommodation of someone it 
dislikes is intrusive to its expression of beliefs.  A similar argument was made by the 
New Mexico Supreme Court, which suggested that Huguenin could simply add a 
message to her website about her faith, exclaiming her religious beliefs while maintaining 
that she abides by all laws.  Perhaps the indignity of persons discriminated against fuels 
the protection of individuals in a way that minimizes the importance of protecting the 
beliefs of business owners. 
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2. Public Accommodation exemptions cause indignity 
     A lesbian in New Jersey described what it was like to be sent out of a bridal shop: “I 
was devastated . . . . I was crying.”259  Lim and Melling explore multiple examples 
similar to this one, where a person who is discriminated against in public feels multiple 
hurtful emotions.
260
  The article also discusses the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
discrimination causing harm to dignity.
261
  The central focus of the dignity argument is, 
“[t]he acknowledgement of dignity is thus critical because, at its core, the question in 
these contestations [of public accommodations and religious freedom] is whether there is 
a governmental interest in prohibiting the discrimination of sufficient strength to override 
any harm to the business owner.”262 
    The short article concludes by suggesting that the detrimental effects of discrimination 
should be reaffirmed in future discussions.
263
  It is necessary to providing an adequate 
and relevant reminder of what an alteration of these laws could lead to. This indignity, as 
discussed in the conclusions section of the thesis, could be resolved by shifting the 
potential burden of impartiality to the business owner.  On point, the authors close their 
article by quoting Judge Bosson in Elane: 
In the smaller, more focused world of the marketplace, of commerce, of public 
accommodation, the [company owners] have to channel their conduct, not their 
                                                 
259
 Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemptions to Public 
Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 705, 706 (2014). 
 
260
 Id. Examples are for gay couples being turned away from hotels and bridal shops.  
 
261
 Id. at 712. 
 
262
 Id. at 720. 
 
263
 Id. at 724. 
 
  59 
beliefs, so as to leave space for other Americans who believe something different. 
That compromise is part of the glue that holds us together as a nation, the 
tolerance that lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That sense of 
respect we owe others, whether or not we believe as they do, illuminates this 
country, setting it apart from the discord that afflicts much of the rest of the 
world. In short, I would say to the [company owners], with the utmost respect: it 
is the price of citizenship.
264
 
     Lim and Melling’s is just one of many articles that recall the controlling outcome of 
Elane, with provocative social comments.  The thesis now discusses multiple articles 
written about Elane. 
VI. ARTICLE REVIEW AND COMMENT 
A. Secular view of Elane 
   Elane is one of the first cases in which an “expressive” or “creative” business was 
declared a public accommodation in violation of a state’s human rights act.265  Elane was 
similar to Hobby Lobby in that it prompted the publication of multiple news stories, law 
journals and opinion pieces.
266
  Many authors wrote about Elane as it was passing 
through the court systems in New Mexico.
267
  After it was denied certiorari by the 
Supreme Court, commentary on the case focused primarily on either the religious aspect 
or LGBTQ rights.   
     A critical piece that focuses on the outcome’s controlling impact and the case’s 
potential overflow into other states is Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual 
Orientation: Should There Be a Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses? by Lucien 
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J. Dhooge.
268 
Shifting away from the humdrum of pitting religion against gay rights, this 
article looks to determine the actual effects of placing caveats other than the religious 
exemption in public accommodation laws.
269
  Dhooge’s article is relevant based on its 
greater application to any business owner and this thesis’ author’s suggested solution to 
the problem in the discussion section of this thesis.  Though the author will argue a 
solution to avoid harming those discriminated, this article argues against granting an 
exemption in the public accommodation laws. 
     The article claims that the loss of religious liberty is exaggerated and that the harm 
experienced by individuals who are discriminated against outweighs the intrusion on 
liberty.
270
  Dhooge posits that the threat to religious freedom is based on two 
assumptions.
271
  The first assumption is that without the religious exemption, there is a 
credible threat to individuals.  The second assumption relates to our understanding of the 
phrase “free exercise of religion” in the context of business.272  The second assumption, 
according to Dhooge, initially referred to unquestionably religious acts only, but now, he 
argues, Hobby Lobby has caused us to widen our understanding of it.
273
  Dhooge claims 
that “business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine 
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fall comfortably within [the] definition [of exercise of religion].”274  Moving through the 
argument of these topics Dhooge’s argument narrows in on the “equation in error”.275  He 
suggests that the nature of business operations should distance themselves from religion, 
to avoid sham claims, false characterization and to not trivialize those true followers of a 
religion.
276
 
     He goes on to claim that frivolous claims would not make it through and that common 
sense would prevail, but he also quotes Justice Ginsburg, who has written, “secular for-
profit corporations do not ‘exists to foster the interests of person subscribing to the same 
religious faith’ nor do they ‘exist to serve a community of believers, to conclude 
otherwise creates a new up-is-down world.’”277  Defending his argument, Dhooge speaks 
to the creation of a two-tier society, the believers and non-believers, and brings the 
argument back to considerations of justice and equality.
278
  His article is provocative and 
well thought-out, but it remains focused on removing religion from the business context, 
on the one hand, and the discrimination of LGBTQ persons, on the other.  His argument 
is compelling to the author of this thesis in that he is trying to talk about the conflict 
between First Amendment rights and public accommodation laws without identifying a 
protected class that is in a higher position than other consumers and thereby stripping the 
argument back to a discussion of business owners versus consumers.  
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B. Hobby Lobby and Federalism Application 
     The topic of over 150 law review articles to date, Hobby Lobby holds a prominent 
position among Supreme Court cases of its time.
279
  A prominent article in the 
scholarship, The Hobby Lobby Moment, discusses the significance of the case, its 
meaning, and future implications.
280  Horwitz focuses his article on what he calls “a 
statutory case [turned] into the legal and political blockbuster of the Term,” narrowing in 
on the social aspect of the case more than the litigation.
281
   
     Horwitz conveys three points: the moment of Hobby Lobby is a significant part of the 
meaning of the case, which represents how law and society change; culture wars move at 
different times and places; moving an issue to be “utterable or capable of being discussed 
intelligently.”282  After discussing historically prominent eras in Supreme Court History, 
such as the Jim Crow laws and the Lochner era, Horwitz’s final observation is the pivotal 
argument for the writing of this thesis: “The important arguments in moments of deep 
social and legal contestation—including Hobby Lobby are not arguments about what the 
law is; they are assertions about what our values should be. They are a battle for the 
descriptive high ground.”283  This argument is articulated somewhat briefly but is directly 
related to Lorence’s opinion; Lorence felt secure that Hobby Lobby’s being heard in front 
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of the Supreme Court was a win for Elane in a tangential way.
284
  The conversation about 
religious freedom is in conflict with the socially present LGBTQ movement. 
     A final mention must be given to Justice Ginsburg’s lengthy and socially circulated 
dissent in Hobby Lobby, which mentions Elane.
285
  After citing Elane as another example 
of a business seeking religious exemption, but not succeeding, she questions, “[H]ow 
does the Court divine which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation, and which 
are not?”286  The juxtaposition of Hobby Lobby and Elane, which are contrasting in their 
outcomes and were decided based on different laws, creates uncertainty for future 
business owners. 
C. Current Events 
1. Sweet Cakes 
     The owners of a bakery in Oregon refused to make a cake for an LGBTQ couple. 
287
 
Accused of discrimination and fearing a lengthy and costly legal battle, the owners 
decided to close their business.
288
  Because Oregon’s laws declared the establishment a 
public accommodation, and because Oregon outlaws discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, the owners found themselves in a situation similar to that of Elane 
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Photography.
289
  As of now, the owners have retreated to making cakes out of their home, 
thus becoming a “private” business.290   
     The owner of a bakery in Colorado recently found out that a cake is not speech.
291
  
The bakery was charged with violating the nondiscrimination laws of Colorado for 
declining to make a cake for an LGBTQ couple.  This ruling demonstrates the explicit 
difference between businesses that provide marriage services and other related business 
types that may try to be considered expressive; this would cause a slippery slope if the 
ruling in Elane were different; determining that “expressive” can’t be the only caveat to 
solving the conflict.  The case does represent a great hypothetical explaining what could 
happen in our future.  A cake without writing on it is not expression, and it would follow 
that a bouquet of flowers is unlikely to be speech either. 
 2. Arlene’s Flowers 
     A floral shop owner in Washington State had provided arrangements to two LGBTQ 
men on multiple occasions.
292
  The owner of the shop then declined to produce 
arrangements for this homosexual couple’s marriage.293  Charged with discrimination 
under Washington State’s public accommodation laws, the owner fought for her right to 
religious freedom and to not support homosexual marriages.  Like the Sweet Cakes case 
in Oregon, one could ask whether the case will be construed similarly to Elane.  The 
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ruling will most likely focus, again, on the difference between photographs, on the one 
hand, and bouquets and flowers, on the other, as means of expression.  The decision in 
the case depends on whether the court takes a broader or narrower view of expression. 
3. Dieseltec 
     An auto mechanic in Michigan explicitly banned LGBTQ parties from seeking service 
at his auto shop by posting his beliefs on Facebook.
294
  Unlike the cases above and Elane, 
where an actual incident of discrimination occurred, this case represents a business owner 
attempting to preempt the issue by expressing his beliefs.  Unfortunately, it wasn’t a 
completely neutral expression of beliefs; the owner threatened that if LGBTQ customers 
attempted to use his services, he would purposely damage their vehicle while also 
arguing with them about their beliefs.
295
  After his post, protestors went to his auto shop, 
and the owner claims to have received threats of violence against him, his shop, and his 
family.
296
  There is much to be discussed in this case, but predominantly it represents 
society’s lack of tolerance for an unpopular opinion, although it also demonstrates 
society’s acceptance of certain opinions, in that supporters also “liked” the owner’s post, 
showing their support for his efforts in a public forum. 
4. Millennials and business 
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     Born between 1980 and 2000, millennials represent the largest generation in America, 
comprising one-third of the United States’ population.297  Considered unique for being 
technologically savvy, connected, and diverse, millennials also have brought about a 
change in entrepreneurship across the United States, especially in rural areas.
298
  Though 
categorically different from previous generations, millennials are entering the work force 
when unemployment is high, which drives them to start their own businesses.
299
  They 
are drawn to entrepreneurship for factors other than just their creativity.
300
  Their diverse 
influence will affect social causes differently from previous generations.
301
  This surge 
into the marketplace suggests a change in value systems that will certainly influence state 
and federal legislatures.
302
 
VII: RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
     The goal of this thesis is to explore the depths of Elane in its role as a controlling 
precedent in the State of New Mexico.  By exploring both legal and circumstantial facts, 
the author intends to use the case as a launch pad to understand the greater effects of the 
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Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision and current Public Accommodation laws.  This 
thesis will provide answers to the following four research questions:  
R1: Is there a loss of First Amendment rights when an LLC owner in New 
Mexico refuses photography services to a same-sex couple? 
 
R2: How did the same-sex marriage decision occurring at the same time in 
New Mexico influence the outcome of Elane?  
 
R3: The Hobby Lobby decision gives religious rights to corporations in 
limited circumstances. Is this a gateway for LLC owners to reaffirm their 
religious freedom through First Amendment rights? 
 
R4: Can reform of Public Accommodation laws reinvigorate First 
Amendment rights in LLC owners? 
 
 
VIII: DISCUSSION AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
1. Interview Discussion 
     The interviews conducted for this thesis give beneficial insight into Elane.  One 
important revelation is that the Alliance Defending Freedom had already been prepared 
for such a case to arrive.  Another is that Lorence felt he was up against judges that 
treated him poorly.  Ilya Shapiro’s comments demonstrated his dedication to Elane as 
well as the importance he saw in the case.  Shapiro has been exposed to multiple civil 
rights and libertarian cases through his position at the Cato Institute and still felt 
compelled to talk about Elane and to throw his weight behind the amicus brief to the 
Supreme Court. 
     The candor and concern both interviewees showed for the topic hasn’t previously been 
documented.  Both considered the legal and social territory involved in Elane to be very 
important to the future.  Lorence also said the New Mexico Supreme Court’s granting 
  68 
same-sex marriage rights in their state at the same time as Elane undeniably had a huge 
impact on the court’s reasoning and treatment of his client.  He noted how Huguenin was 
being treated in the media as well as the blatant discrimination against religious persons 
by the LGBTQ community. He simply couldn’t grasp how the situation unfolded as it 
did.  Huguenin was surprised and didn’t have any idea that she had given up any First 
Amendment rights; she was not aware that she could be compelled by the state to take a 
photo of something she didn’t believe in.  When the author asked for advice to future 
business owners, Shapiro responded, “call your lawyer.” 
     As confirmed in these first-hand accounts, it is clear that to operate a business in New 
Mexico is to sacrifice at least some First Amendment rights.  The statute reads as follows: 
“‘[P]ublic accommodation’ means any establishment that provides or offers its services, 
facilities, accommodations or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private 
club or other place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.”303  It 
is unclear if this classification of a photography business remains appropriate in the face 
of the results from Elane.   
2. Literature Discussion 
     The author will use the Michigan case involving the auto mechanic, described above, 
in order to explore whether Hobby Lobby can be used as an example of a way forward for 
reforming Public Accommodation laws.  The original public accommodation laws sought 
to ensure that discrimination would not occur in situations where essential services were 
being provided, whereas the broad application of these laws today means that non-
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essential business types also must follow such rules.  This creates a conflict case in which 
the public accommodation law is in conflict with First Amendment rights, such as in 
Elane.  
     Some legal theorists have attempted to define what types of businesses should be 
included or excluded in public accommodation laws.
304
  Some legislatures have lumped 
together businesses that simply should serve protected classes.
305
  However, because 
there is no rationale for this law, the courts are in a state of confusion.
306
  Since there is 
not a unified theory on which to create a foundation for this body of law, there will 
continue to be great variance in how these laws are applied.
307
  The lack of such a theory 
also makes distinguishing between a private business and a public business very 
difficult.
308
 
     To improve the situation, states should put more effort into the legislation of public 
accommodation laws, and courts should evaluate individual cases and look to history and 
precedent before declaring whether a business is a public accommodation.  There can be 
no theory or foundation to back up the decision without a clear understanding of the 
original civil and social meanings of “public accommodation” as presented in history.  
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Outside of granting all members of society equal access to public establishments,
309
 there 
is no continuing theoretical justification for classifying private businesses as public 
accommodations.  Such a right of access will eventually lead to private expressive 
business owners being compelled to speak against their will, thus implicating if not 
violating their First Amendment rights,
310
 as demonstrated by the interviews and 
legislation discussed in this thesis. 
3. Presentation of Results 
     State public accommodation laws currently suggest one outcome: Business owners of 
all types will are likely to be considered public accommodations.
311
  Considering the lack 
of uncertainty, and probability of classification as a public accommodation, business 
owners who want to avoid litigation should err on the side of caution and adopt the 
responsibilities of a public accommodation.  Given the current climate, creative 
businesses are fertile grounds for litigation, as reiterated by Lorence.
312
  Though the 
Supreme Court has demonstrated that certain expressive content warrants special 
exemption, such as in the Colorado case concerning the parade, it is more likely than not 
that a business will not be allowed to discriminate at all, even when their First 
Amendment rights appear to be violated.  Hobby Lobby does not stand for this concept in 
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each state, because like New Mexico, the Acts particular to a state may create stricter 
compliance.      
     The Supreme Court of New Mexico created a very interesting controlling precedent 
with its decision in Elane.
313
  When two huge and delicate civil rights are pitted against 
each other, the equation is never easy to solve, no matter if you are wearing judicial robes 
or jeans and a t-shirt.  The First Amendment applies to all United States citizens.  But, 
New Mexico has chosen to follow their state’s Act (NMRFRA) which thereby conflicts 
with the federal understanding of the First Amendments application. 
     Elane demonstrates that because of this freedom granted by the First Amendment we 
are going to have conflict.  Based on this case study, as well as cases before it, it could be 
concluded that there will be no winner in any such conflict.  To best represent the First 
Amendment private business owners in light of Hobby Lobby and the mind wrenching 
outcome of Elane, should be protected and maintain their First Amendment freedoms 
when incorporating their business. 
     To weigh the law against one party or another this case should not be created or 
contemplated with varied hypotheticals that pit one race, religion, sex or belief against 
another.  You have your hypothetical standing right in front of you: Elane.  All American 
citizens, regardless of their beliefs, possess freedoms.  The First Amendment applies to 
everyone, and taking the personal convictions and political energies out of any multitude 
of hypotheticals, there is a new way to think about our conflicting parties in Elane.  We 
have private business owners, and their customers. 
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 When you think of the equation in this way, it is easier to talk about the puzzle.  
What we can say about all private business owners is that to stay in business they must 
make a profit.  To make a profit, they must be a certifiable, legally sound, and 
functioning as a business.  This process and the success of the business owner stands for 
much more than the filing of their taxes.  They contribute to society in non-monetary 
ways as well.  They have etched out a small segment of the market and are trying to make 
their mark.  States charge businesses to operate, and they operate under certain conditions 
and try to make money. 
 The second part of the equation is the customer.  This party and its contribution to 
the marketplace is less well known.  While the customer has the rights and freedoms of 
all others, she and her contribution to the marketplace are entirely theoretical.  Maybe the 
customer will be discriminated against, but it can’t be known for sure.  What is known, 
however, is that a different member of society has started a business—and projections say 
there will be more in the future—and that these private business owners, under the First 
Amendment and in line with libertarian theory, should retain their right to their free 
speech. 
     Will the outcome always be positive?  No.  But if we can make any efforts to avoid 
litigation and let a free society govern itself, all the better.  It then becomes the business 
owner’s choice to refuse service and risk a loss of profits.314  Private business owners and 
participants in an expressive business should not be compelled to speak against their 
                                                 
314
 Dhooge, supra note 268 (suggesting that there will not be a loss of profits if the business owner 
discriminates against parties). The author of this thesis disagrees, based on millennial reports in this thesis 
suggesting the diverse and “brand” conscience millennials.  
 
  73 
beliefs.  Their ownership of a business cements their foundation in the marketplace 
legally, versus a theoretically discriminated against customer. 
     Finally, to link the pieces of the equation together, we have the theory of Freedom of 
Expression.  Emerson wrote about a “safety valve” where without free expression, the 
real problems of society may remain hidden and fester.
315
  And this, conceptually, speaks 
to the current social aspect of the problem of balance and stability of society’s current 
values.   If we adjust the laws we are potentially just hiding and shadowing the issue at 
hand.  If we are to allow true freedom of expression, a consumer should be well informed 
of the business and values of that business when they make their purchase.  Even if the 
laws could be quickly adjusted, that may not be the solution because finding out the 
beliefs of business owners may be of a greater value. 
     And even so, the laws have not been adjusted.  And there is no proof that 
discrimination can ever be defeated.  It is ever present.  That is why Elane represents a 
warning to future business owners and creative millennials, who must understand what 
rights they can lose when starting a business.   
     The free speech rights of Elane Photography should be protected, despite the Public 
Accommodation laws of New Mexico.  Here, note the use of Elane Photography versus 
Huguenin.  The author of the thesis also suggests that in addition to the outcome of 
Hobby Lobby’s standing for religious support in the future, it also stands for a connection 
between businesses and their owners; it represents the idea that business have a legal 
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identity just as much as their owners, and that both can have religious beliefs.
316
  Shapiro 
emphasized the contemporary conflicts we see with individual business owners 
possessing their freedoms should now be conveyed not only to them as an individual but 
via their business if it is expressive, such as photography is as well.
317
 
IX: CONCLUSION 
     The most common deference to First Amendment rights that arises out of the literature 
concerns the accommodation of religious freedoms; these freedoms often clash with the 
current LGBTQ movement.  What is not being said, except for by Dhooge, is that 
granting exemptions to religious business owners only ignores a whole group of other 
business owners who may have strong, albeit not religious, convictions they wish to 
express in the running of their business.  This presents business owners with two options: 
have a religion to fall back on, or accommodate all customers.  The decline in religious 
affiliation among the nation’s younger generation has taken place almost as fast as the 
LGBTQ movement.
318
  So, without religion, it has been suggested that we narrow public 
accommodation laws to “expressive” businesses.319  But, as the example of the baker and 
the florist demonstrate, perhaps that too is a slippery slope.  Why should the 
accommodation of belief systems have to conform only to pre-classified hypotheticals?  
The author’s solution drops the emotional and personal identifiers that are involved in 
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these determinations and suggests the creation of two simple categories: business owner 
and consumer. 
    The solution is presented as a means to solve the legal problem, the social problem, 
and, it is hoped, the emotional problem.  Legally, state accommodation laws may do as 
they please.  But federally, if the business in question affects interstate commerce, 
legislation will pre-emptively disallow whatever the state has allowed for with regards to 
specific classes (race, color, religion or national origin).
320
  The author of this thesis 
proposes that a new category of business could be created, called “expressive, local, 
private” businesses (ELP)—expressive, meaning non-essential; local, meaning not 
federal, and thus out of the jurisdiction of the discriminatory practices disallowed by the 
Civil Rights Act’s protected classes; and private, meaning the business would have to be 
private. These can be varied among states but would be single or family-owned 
businesses. 
     The choice to exempt this type of business from accommodating everyone would not 
be given solely for the business owners’ benefit.  If an ELP is looking to discriminate 
against another party for any reason, they should be required to bear an ethical burden.  
Since the Civil Rights era, indignity has been acknowledged as one of the great harms 
caused by discrimination.  It would be unfair to place the hypothetical customer entirely 
in this harm’s way.  In this vein, the author also suggests that an independent association 
be created in the likeness of the Better Business Bureau, called Honest ELPs, or HELP.  
This organization could create advertising campaigns, state-based stickers, web 
disclaimers, and social media messages, certifying whether an ELP is Honest; that is, 
                                                 
320
 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
  76 
does the ELP accommodate all persons? If so, they would be certified as such by the 
organization and could advertise this to let patrons know they serve all customers.  
Similarly, for example, if the ELP does not want to serve females, they would receive a 
sticker sanctioned by HELP that identifies their non-acceptance of females.   
     The situation of the auto mechanic in Michigan serves to demonstrate that there is no 
perfect solution.  Even being up front about your business’s values and approaching the 
subject head on will breed conflict.  But, just the same, there is no time to waste in 
developing possible solutions. 
     This thesis set out to answer four questions.  With the interviews and legal and 
scholarly research, the questions have been answered.  It has been clearly demonstrated 
that businesses operating in New Mexico have lost some First Amendment rights.  
Additionally, the question of whether the passage of same-sex marriage legislation in 
New Mexico affected the decision in Elane has been answered in the affirmative.  Also, 
the interviews and discussion of current legislation have shown that Hobby Lobby indeed 
could be a gateway for solving problems such as that behind Elane.  Finally, as shown in 
the interview with Ilya Shapiro, it appears that yes, reforming Public Accommodation 
law could help reinvigorate the push for First Amendment rights for business owners; 
however, the actual effects of such legislation are yet to be understood.  With this 
contribution, the author developed a similar idea for narrowing public accommodation 
laws and shifting the burden accordingly. 
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     As theory and history teach, there will eternally be conflict and we can only seek to 
manage the masses and survive.  Like other authors on this topic, the author of this thesis 
does not condone discrimination, but she strongly supports freedom. 
     The parties in Elane, like the parties in Supreme Court cases, have moved on with 
their lives.  They didn’t wake up one day and decide to stand as symbols for others.  They 
woke up and decided to be themselves.  Similar situations are happening every day, most 
of which go unnoticed.  
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Appendix A 
 
Public Accommodation Defined 
Alabama 
Public accommodation facilities. Buildings, facilities, and improvements for the 
accommodation of visitors to such public parks, including, without limitation of 
the foregoing, motels, restaurants, coffee shops, stores to provide groceries, drugs, 
and other items, sports, gift and souvenir shops, and launderettes; provided, 
however, that nothing contained in this chapter is intended to authorize any such 
corporation itself to operate as a commercial enterprise any such shops, stores, 
motels, or restaurants.
321
 
 
Alaska 
“public accommodation” means a place that caters or offers its services, goods, or 
facilities to the general public and includes a public inn, restaurant, eating house, 
hotel, motel, soda fountain, soft drink parlor, tavern, night club, roadhouse, place 
where food or spirituous or malt liquors are sold for consumption, trailer park, 
resort, campground, barber shop, beauty parlor, bathroom, rest house, theater, 
swimming pool, skating rink, golf course, cafe, ice cream parlor, transportation 
company, and all other public amusement and business establishments, subject 
only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to 
all persons;
322
 
 
Arizona 
“Places of public accommodation” means all public places of entertainment, 
amusement or recreation, all public places where food or beverages are sold for 
consumption on the premises, all public places which are conducted for the 
lodging of transients or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking 
health or recreation and all establishments which cater or offer their services, 
facilities or goods to or solicit patronage from the members of the general public. 
Any dwelling as defined in § 41-1491, or any private club, or any place which is 
in its nature distinctly private is not a place of public accommodation.
323
 
 
“Dwelling” means either: 
(a) Any building, structure or part of a building or structure that is occupied as, or 
designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families. 
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(b) Any vacant land that is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location 
of a building, structure or part of a building or structure described by subdivision 
(a) of this paragraph.
324
 
 
Arkansas 
“Place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement” means any 
place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies 
accommodations, goods, or services to the general public, or that solicits or 
accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or that is supported directly 
or indirectly by government funds, but “place of public resort, accommodation, 
assemblage, or amusement” does not include: 
(A) Any lodging establishment which contains not more than five (5) rooms for 
rent and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as a 
residence; or 
(B) Any private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public;
325
 
 
California 
“Place of public accommodation” has the same meaning as “public 
accommodation,” as set forth in Section 12181(7) of Title 42 of the United States 
Code and the federal regulations adopted pursuant to that section
326
 
 
Public accommodation 
The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes 
of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce-- 
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment 
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire 
and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the 
residence of such proprietor; 
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment; 
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public 
gathering; 
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or 
other sales or rental establishment; 
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, 
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pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, 
or other service establishment; 
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; 
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; 
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private 
school, or other place of education; 
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption 
agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise 
or recreation.
327
 
  
Colorado 
“place of public accommodation” means any place of business engaged in any 
sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to the public, including but not limited to any 
business offering wholesale or retail sales to the public; any place to eat, drink, 
sleep, or rest, or any combination thereof; any sporting or recreational area and 
facility; any public transportation facility; a barber shop, bathhouse, swimming 
pool, bath, steam or massage parlor, gymnasium, or other establishment 
conducted to serve the health, appearance, or physical condition of a person; a 
campsite or trailer camp; a dispensary, clinic, hospital, convalescent home, or 
other institution for the sick, ailing, aged, or infirm; a mortuary, undertaking 
parlor, or cemetery; an educational institution; or any public building, park, arena, 
theater, hall, auditorium, museum, library, exhibit, or public facility of any kind 
whether indoor or outdoor. “Place of public accommodation” shall not include a 
church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious 
purposes.
328
 
 
Connecticut 
“Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment 
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, 
including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it 
is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or 
rent;
329
 
 
Delaware 
A “place of public accommodation” means any establishment which caters to or 
offers goods or services or facilities to, or solicits patronage from, the general 
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public. This definition includes state agencies, local government agencies, and 
state-funded agencies performing public functions. This definition shall apply to 
hotels and motels catering to the transient public, but it shall not apply to the sale 
or rental of houses, housing units, apartments, rooming houses or other dwellings, 
nor to tourist homes with less than 10 rental units catering to the transient 
public.
330
 
 
District of Columbia 
“Place of public accommodation” means all places included in the meaning of 
such terms as inns, taverns, road houses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the 
entertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those seeking 
health, recreation or rest; restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is 
sold for consumption on the premises; buffets, saloons, barrooms, or any store, 
park or enclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; ice cream parlors, 
confectioneries, soda fountains and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit 
preparation or their derivatives, or where beverages of any kind are retailed for 
consumption on the premises; wholesale and retail stores, and establishments 
dealing with goods or services of any kind, including, but not limited to, the credit 
facilities thereof; banks, savings and loan associations, establishments of 
mortgage bankers and brokers, all other financial institutions, and credit 
information bureaus; insurance companies and establishments of insurance policy 
brokers; dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bath-houses, swimming pools, laundries 
and all other cleaning establishments; barber shops, beauty parlors, theaters, 
motion picture houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating 
rinks, amusement and recreation parks, trailer camps, resort camps, fairs, bowling 
alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiards and pool parlors; 
garages, all public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air, as well as 
the stations and terminals thereof; travel or tour advisory services, agencies or 
bureaus; public halls and public elevators of buildings and structures, occupied by 
2 or more tenants, or by the owner and 1 or more tenants. Such term shall not 
include any institution, club, or place of accommodation which is in its nature 
distinctly private except, that any such institution, club or place of 
accommodation shall be subject to the provisions of § 2-1402.67. A place of 
accommodation, institution, or club shall not be considered in its nature distinctly 
private if the place of accommodation, institution, or club: 
 
(A) Has 350 or more members; 
(B) Serves meals on a regular basis; and 
(C) Regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, 
meals, or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for 
the furtherance of trade or business.
331
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Florida 
“Public accommodations” means places of public accommodation, lodgings, 
facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, 
gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other covered 
establishments. Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a 
place of public accommodation within the meaning of this section: 
(a) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to 
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than four rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied 
by the proprietor of such establishment as his or her residence. 
(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other 
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, 
including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any 
retail establishment, or any gasoline station. 
(c) Any motion picture theater, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or 
other place of exhibition or entertainment. 
(d) Any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any 
establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of 
which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds 
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
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Georgia 
Not defined. 
 
Hawaii 
“Place of public accommodation” means a business, accommodation, refreshment, 
entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind whose goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or 
otherwise made available to the general public as customers, clients, or visitors. By 
way of example, but not of limitation, place of public accommodation includes 
facilities of the following types: 
1) A facility providing services relating to travel or transportation; 
(2) An inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that provides lodging to transient 
guests; 
(3) A restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility 
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises of a retail 
establishment; 
(4) A shopping center or any establishment that sells goods or services at retail; 
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(5) An establishment licensed under chapter 281 doing business under a class 4, 5, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 license, as defined in section 281-31; 
6) A motion picture theater, other theater, auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, 
concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment; 
(7) A barber shop, beauty shop, bathhouse, swimming pool, gymnasium, reducing or 
massage salon, or other establishment conducted to serve the health, appearance, or 
physical condition of persons; 
(8) A park, a campsite, or trailer facility, or other recreation facility; 
9) A comfort station; or a dispensary, clinic, hospital, convalescent home, or other 
institution for the infirm;
333
 
 
  
 
Idaho 
“Place of public accommodation” means a business, accommodation, 
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages 
or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the 
public;
334
 
 
Illinois 
Place of Public Accommodation. “Place of public accommodation” includes, but 
is not limited to: 
(1) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment 
located within a building that contains not more than 5 units for rent or hire and 
that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence 
of such proprietor; 
(2) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
(3) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment; 
(4) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public 
gathering; 
(5) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or 
other sales or rental establishment; 
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(6) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, 
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, 
or other service establishment; 
(7) public conveyances on air, water, or land; 
(8) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; 
(9) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; 
(10) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
(11) a non-sectarian nursery, day care center, elementary, secondary, 
undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education; 
(12) a senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, non-sectarian adoption 
agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
(13) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of 
exercise or recreation.
335
 
 
Indiana 
“Public accommodation” means any establishment that caters or offers its services 
or facilities or goods to the general public.
336
 
 
Iowa 
a. “Public accommodation” means each and every place, establishment, or facility 
of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods 
for a fee or charge to nonmembers of any organization or association utilizing the 
place, establishment, or facility, provided that any place, establishment, or facility 
that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the nonmembers gratuitously 
shall be deemed a public accommodation if the accommodation receives 
governmental support or subsidy. Public accommodation shall not mean any bona 
fide private club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature 
distinctly private, except when such distinctly private place, establishment, or 
facility caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the nonmembers for fee or 
charge or gratuitously, it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such 
period. 
b. “Public accommodation” includes each state and local government unit or tax-
supported district of whatever kind, nature, or class that offers services, facilities, 
benefits, grants or goods to the public, gratuitously or otherwise. This paragraph 
shall not be construed by negative implication or otherwise to restrict any part or 
portion of the preexisting definition of the term “public accommodation”.337 
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“Public accommodations” means any person who caters or offers goods, services, 
facilities and accommodations to the public. Public accommodations include, but 
are not limited to, any lodging establishment or food service establishment, as 
defined by K.S.A. 36-501, and amendments thereto; any bar, tavern, barbershop, 
beauty parlor, theater, skating rink, bowling alley, billiard parlor, amusement 
park, recreation park, swimming pool, lake, gymnasium, mortuary or cemetery 
which is open to the public; or any public transportation facility. Public 
accommodations do not include a religious or nonprofit fraternal or social 
association or corporation.
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Kentucky 
“place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” includes any place, store, 
or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or 
services to the general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of 
the general public or which is supported directly or indirectly by government 
funds, except that: 
(1) A private club is not a “place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” 
if its policies are determined by its members and its facilities or services are 
available only to its members and their bona fide guests; 
(2) “Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” does not include a 
rooming or boarding house containing not more than one (1) room for rent or hire 
and which is within a building occupied by the proprietor as his residence; and 
(3) “Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” does not include a 
religious organization and its activities and facilities if the application of KRS 
344.120 would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization, 
subject to paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection. 
(a) Any organization that teaches or advocates hatred based on race, color, or 
national origin shall not be considered a religious organization for the purposes of 
this subsection. 
(b) A religious organization that sponsors nonreligious activities that are operated 
and governed by the organization, and that are offered to the general public, shall 
not deny participation by an individual in those activities on the ground of 
disability, race, color, religion, or national origin. 
(c) A religious organization shall not, under any circumstances, discriminate in its 
activities or use of its facilities on the ground of disability, race, color, or national 
origin.
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“Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” means any place, store, 
or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or 
services to the general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of 
the general public, or which is supported directly or indirectly by government 
funds. However, a bona fide private club is not a place of public accommodation, 
resort, or amusement if its policies are determined solely by its members and its 
facilities or services are available only to its members and their bona fide 
guests.
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Maine 
Place of public accommodation. ‘Place of public accommodation’ means a 
facility, operated by a public or private entity, whose operations fall within at 
least one of the following categories: 
A. An inn, hotel, motel or other place of lodging, whether conducted for the 
entertainment or accommodation of transient guests or those seeking health, 
recreation or rest; 
B. A restaurant, eating house, bar, tavern, buffet, saloon, soda fountain, ice cream 
parlor or other establishment serving or selling food or drink; 
C. A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, roof garden, airdrome or 
other place of exhibition or entertainment; 
D. An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall or other place of public 
gathering; 
E. A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, 
garage, gasoline station or other sales or rental establishment; 
F. A laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, 
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, 
dispensary, clinic, bathhouse or other service establishment; 
G. All public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air as well as a 
terminal, depot or other station used for specified public transportation; 
H. A museum, library, gallery or other place of public display or collection; 
I. A park, zoo, amusement park, race course, skating rink, fair, bowling alley, golf 
course, golf club, country club, gymnasium, health spa, shooting gallery, billiard 
or pool parlor, swimming pool, seashore accommodation or boardwalk or other 
place of recreation, exercise or health; 
J. A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate or postgraduate school or 
other place of education; 
K. A day-care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption 
agency or other social service center establishment; 
L. Public elevators of buildings occupied by 2 or more tenants or by the owner 
and one or more tenants; 
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M. A municipal building, courthouse, town hall or other establishment of the 
State or a local government; and 
N. Any establishment that in fact caters to, or offers its goods, facilities or 
services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from, the general public. 
When a place of public accommodation is located in a private residence, the 
portion of the residence used exclusively as a residence is not covered by this 
subchapter, but that portion used exclusively in the operation of the place of 
public accommodation or that portion used both for the place of public 
accommodation and for the residential purposes is covered by this subchapter. 
The covered portion of the residence extends to those elements used to enter the 
place of public accommodation, and those exterior and interior portions of the 
residence available to or used by customers or clients, including rest rooms.
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Maryland 
“place of public accommodation” means: 
(1) an inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment that provides lodging to transient 
guests; 
(2) a restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other 
facility principally engaged in selling food or alcoholic beverages for 
consumption on or off the premises, including a facility located on the premises of 
a retail establishment or gasoline station; 
(3) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other 
place of exhibition or entertainment; 
(4) a retail establishment that: 
(i) is operated by a public or private entity; and 
(ii) offers goods, services, entertainment, recreation, or transportation; and 
(5) an establishment: 
(i) 1. that is physically located within the premises of any other 
establishment covered by this subtitle; or 
2. within the premises of which any other establishment covered by this subtitle is 
physically located; and 
(ii) that holds itself out as serving patrons of the covered establishment.
342
 
 
 
Massachusetts 
A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning hereof 
shall be defined as and shall be deemed to include any place, whether licensed or 
unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general 
public and, without limiting the generality of this definition, whether or not it be 
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(1) an inn, tavern, hotel, shelter, roadhouse, motel, trailer camp or resort for 
transient or permanent guests or patrons seeking housing or lodging, food, drink, 
entertainment, health, recreation or rest; (2) a carrier, conveyance or elevator for 
the transportation of persons, whether operated on land, water or in the air, and 
the stations, terminals and facilities appurtenant thereto; (3) a gas station, garage, 
retail store or establishment, including those dispensing personal services; (4) a 
restaurant, bar or eating place, where food, beverages, confections or their 
derivatives are sold for consumption on or off the premises; (5) a rest room, 
barber shop, beauty parlor, bathhouse, seashore facilities or swimming pool, 
except such rest room, bathhouse or seashore facility as may be segregated on the 
basis of sex; (6) a boardwalk or other public highway; (7) an auditorium, theatre, 
music hall, meeting place or hall, including the common halls of buildings; (8) a 
place of public amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment; (9) a 
public library, museum or planetarium; or (10) a hospital, dispensary or clinic 
operating for profit; provided, however, that with regard to the prohibition on sex 
discrimination, this section shall not apply to a place of exercise for the exclusive 
use of persons of the same sex which is a bona fide fitness facility established for 
the sole purpose of promoting and maintaining physical and mental health 
through physical exercise and instruction, if such facility does not receive funds 
from a government source, nor to any corporation or entity authorized, created or 
chartered by federal law for the express purpose of promoting the health, social, 
educational vocational, and character development of a single sex; provided, 
further, that with regard to the prohibition of sex discrimination, those 
establishments which rent rooms on a temporary or permanent basis for the 
exclusive use of persons of the same sex shall not be considered places of public 
accommodation and shall not apply to any other part of such an establishment.
343
 
Michigan 
“Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, 
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or 
institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or 
otherwise made available to the public. Place of public accommodation also 
includes the facilities of the following private clubs: 
(i) A country club or golf club. 
(ii) A boating or yachting club. 
(iii) A sports or athletic club. 
(iv) A dining club, except a dining club that in good faith limits its membership to 
the members of a particular religion for the purpose of furthering the teachings or 
principles of that religion and not for the purpose of excluding individuals of a 
particular gender, race, or color.
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 Minnesota 
“Place of public accommodation” means a business, accommodation, 
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, 
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages 
or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the 
public.
345
 
 
Mississippi 
(1) Every person, firm or corporation engaged in any public business, trade or 
profession of any kind whatsoever in the State of Mississippi, including, but not 
restricted to, hotels, motels, tourist courts, lodging houses, restaurants, dining 
room or lunch counters, barber shops, beauty parlors, theatres, moving picture 
shows, or other places of entertainment and amusement, including public parks 
and swimming pools, stores of any kind wherein merchandise is offered for sale, 
is hereby authorized and empowered to choose or select the person or persons he 
or it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and empowered to 
refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any person that the owner, manager or 
employee of such public place of business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or 
serve. The provisions of this section shall not apply to corporations or 
associations engaged in the business of selling electricity, natural gas, or water to 
the general public, or furnishing telephone service to the public. 
(2) Any public place of business may, if it so desires, display a sign posted in said 
place of business serving notice upon the general public that “the management 
reserves the right to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any person,” however, the 
display of such a sign shall not be a prerequisite to exercising the authority 
conferred by this section. 
(3) Any person who enters a public place of business in this state, or upon the 
premises thereof, and is requested or ordered to leave therefrom by the owner, 
manager or any employee thereof, and after having been so requested or ordered 
to leave, refuses so to do, shall be guilty of a trespass and upon conviction 
therefor shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisoned 
in jail not more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
346
 
 
 Missouri 
“Places of public accommodation”, all places or businesses offering or holding 
out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages or 
accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and safety of the general 
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public or such public places providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement, 
including, but not limited to: 
(a) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to 
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied 
by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence; 
(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other 
facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, 
including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any 
retail establishment; 
(c) Any gasoline station, including all facilities located on the premises of such 
gasoline station and made available to the patrons thereof; 
(d) Any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other 
place of exhibition or entertainment; 
(e) Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state 
or any agency or subdivision thereof, or any public corporation; and any such 
facility supported in whole or in part by public funds; 
(f) Any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any 
establishment otherwise covered by this section or within the premises of which is 
physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as 
serving patrons of such covered establishment;
347
 
 
Montana 
(a) “Public accommodation” means a place that caters or offers its services, 
goods, or facilities to the general public subject only to the conditions and 
limitations established by law and applicable to all persons. It includes 
without limitation a public inn, restaurant, eating house, hotel, roadhouse, 
place where food or alcoholic beverages or malt liquors are sold for 
consumption, motel, soda fountain, soft drink parlor, tavern, nightclub, trailer 
park, resort, campground, barbering, cosmetology, electrology, esthetics, or 
manicuring salon or shop, bathroom, resthouse, theater, swimming pool, 
skating rink, golf course, cafe, ice cream parlor, transportation company, or 
hospital and all other public amusement and business establishments. 
(b) Public accommodation does not include an institution, club, or place of 
accommodation that proves that it is by its nature distinctly private. An 
institution, club, or place of accommodation may not be considered by its 
nature distinctly private if it has more than 100 members, provides regular 
meal service, and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, 
facilities, services, meals, or beverages, directly or indirectly, from or on 
behalf of nonmembers, for the furtherance of trade or business. For the 
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purposes of this subsection (20), any lodge of a recognized national fraternal 
organization is considered by its nature distinctly private.
348
 
 
Nebraska 
places of public accommodation shall mean all places or businesses offering or holding 
out to the general public goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages, and 
accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare, and safety of the general public 
and such public places providing food, shelter, recreation, and amusement including, but 
not limited to: 
(1) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient 
guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more 
than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such 
establishment as his residence; 
(2) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility 
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including but not 
limited to any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; 
(3) Any gasoline station, including all facilities located on the premises of such station 
and made available to the patrons thereof; 
(4) Any motion picture house, theatre, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place 
of exhibition or entertainment; 
(5) Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state or any 
agency or subdivision thereof, or any public corporation, and any such facility supported 
in whole or in part by public funds; and 
(6) Any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any 
establishment otherwise covered by this section or within the premises of which is 
physically located any such covered establishment and which holds itself out as serving 
patrons of such covered establishment.
349
 
 
Nevada 
“Place of public accommodation” means: 
(a) Any inn, hotel, motel or other establishment which provides lodging to transient 
guests, except an establishment located within a building which contains not more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of the 
establishment as the proprietor's residence; 
(b) Any restaurant, bar, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, casino or any 
other facility where food or spirituous or malt liquors are sold, including any such facility 
located on the premises of any retail establishment; 
(c) Any gasoline station; 
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(d) Any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment; 
(e) Any auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, stadium or other place of public 
gathering; 
(f) Any bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center or other 
sales or rental establishment; 
(g) Any laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance 
office, office of a provider of health care, hospital or other service establishment; 
(h) Any terminal, depot or other station used for specified public transportation; 
(i) Any museum, library, gallery or other place of public display or collection; 
(j) Any park, zoo, amusement park or other place of recreation; 
(k) Any nursery, private school or university or other place of education; 
(l) Any day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption 
agency or other social service establishment; 
(m) Any gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course or other place of exercise or 
recreation; 
(n) Any other establishment or place to which the public is invited or which is intended 
for public use; and 
(o) Any establishment physically containing or contained within any of the 
establishments described in paragraphs (a) to (n), inclusive, which holds itself out as 
serving patrons of the described establishment.
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New Hampshire 
“Place of public accommodation” includes any inn, tavern or hotel, whether conducted 
for entertainment, the housing or lodging of transient guests, or for the benefit, use or 
accommodations of those seeking health, recreation or rest, any restaurant, eating house, 
public conveyance on land or water, bathhouse, barbershop, theater, golf course, sports 
arena, health care provider, and music or other public hall, store or other establishment 
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public. “Public 
accommodation” shall not include any institution or club which is in its nature distinctly 
private.
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New Jersey 
“A place of public accommodation” shall include, but not be limited to: any tavern, 
roadhouse, hotel, motel, trailer camp, summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, whether 
for entertainment of transient guests or accommodation of those seeking health, 
recreation or rest; any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, 
establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant, 
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eating house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; any place 
maintained for the sale of ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, soda 
water or confections, or where any beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on 
the premises; any garage, any public conveyance operated on land or water, or in the air, 
any stations and terminals thereof; any bathhouse, boardwalk, or seashore 
accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or hall; any theatre, motion-picture 
house, music hall, roof garden, skating rink, swimming pool, amusement and recreation 
park, fair, bowling alley, gymnasium, shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other 
place of amusement; any comfort station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any public 
library; any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or business school, high 
school, academy, college and university, or any educational institution under the 
supervision of the State Board of Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the 
State of New Jersey. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to 
any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature 
distinctly private; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility 
operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution, and the right of a 
natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child 
under his control is hereby affirmed; nor shall anything herein contained be construed to 
bar any private secondary or post secondary school from using in good faith criteria other 
than race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, gender identity or expression or 
affectional or sexual orientation in the admission of students.
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New Mexico 
“public accommodation” means any establishment that provides or offers its services, 
facilities, accommodations or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private 
club or other place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private;
353
 
New York 
The term “place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” shall include, except as 
hereinafter specified, all places included in the meaning of such terms as: inns, taverns, 
road houses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the entertainment of transient guests 
or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, or restaurants, or 
eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; buffets, 
saloons, barrooms, or any store, park or enclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are 
sold; ice cream parlors, confectionaries, soda fountains, and all stores where ice cream, 
ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, or where beverages of any kind are retailed 
for consumption on the premises; wholesale and retail stores and establishments dealing 
with goods or services of any kind, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bath-houses, 
swimming pools, laundries and all other cleaning establishments, barber shops, beauty 
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parlors, theatres, motion picture houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race 
courses, skating rinks, amusement and recreation parks, trailer camps, resort camps, fairs, 
bowling alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool parlors; 
garages, all public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air, as well as the 
stations and terminals thereof; travel or tour advisory services, agencies or bureaus; 
public halls and public elevators of buildings and structures occupied by two or more 
tenants, or by the owner and one or more tenants. Such term shall not include public 
libraries, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, 
colleges and universities, extension courses, and all educational institutions under the 
supervision of the regents of the state of New York; any such public library, kindergarten, 
primary and secondary school, academy, college, university, professional school, 
extension course or other education facility, supported in whole or in part by public funds 
or by contributions solicited from the general public; or any institution, club or place of 
accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private. In no event shall an 
institution, club or place of accommodation be considered in its nature distinctly private 
if it has more than one hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly 
receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages 
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of a nonmember for the furtherance of trade or 
business. An institution, club, or place of accommodation which is not deemed distinctly 
private pursuant to this subdivision may nevertheless apply such selective criteria as it 
chooses in the use of its facilities, in evaluating applicants for membership and in the 
conduct of its activities, so long as such selective criteria do not constitute discriminatory 
practices under this article or any other provision of law. For the purposes of this section, 
a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent 
orders law but formed under any other law of this state or a religious corporation 
incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law shall be deemed to 
be in its nature distinctly private. 
No institution, club, organization or place of accommodation which sponsors or conducts 
any amateur athletic contest or sparring exhibition and advertises or bills such contest or 
exhibition as a New York state championship contest or uses the words “New York state” 
in its announcements shall be deemed a private exhibition within the meaning of this 
section.
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North Carolina 
“Place of public accommodations” includes, but is not limited to, any place, facility, 
store, other establishment, hotel, or motel, which supplies goods or services on the 
premises to the public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of any person.
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North Dakota 
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“Public accommodation” means every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, 
nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a 
fee, charge, or gratuity. “Public accommodation” does not include a bona fide private 
club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private; 
provided, however, the distinctly private place, establishment, or facility is a “public 
accommodation” during the period it caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the 
general public for a fee, charge, or gratuity.
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Ohio 
“Place of public accommodation” means any inn, restaurant, eating house, barbershop, 
public conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, other place for the sale of 
merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public.
357
 
Oklahoma 
“place of public accommodation” does not include barber shops or beauty shops or 
privately-owned resort or amusement establishments or an establishment located within a 
building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually 
occupied by the proprietor of the establishment as his residence.
358
 
 
Oregon 
(1) A place of public accommodation, subject to the exclusions in subsection (2) of this 
section, means: 
(a) Any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or 
privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation 
or otherwise. 
(b) Any place that is open to the public and owned or maintained by a public body, as 
defined in ORS 174.109, regardless of whether the place is commercial in nature. 
(c) Any service to the public that is provided by a public body, as defined in ORS 
174.109, regardless of whether the service is commercial in nature. 
(2) A place of public accommodation does not include: 
(a) A Department of Corrections institution as defined in ORS 421.005. 
(b) A state hospital as defined in ORS 162.135. 
(c) A youth correction facility as defined in ORS 420.005. 
(d) A local correction facility or lockup as defined in ORS 169.005. 
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(e) An institution, bona fide club or place of accommodation that is in its nature distinctly 
private.
359
 
 
Pennsylvania 
The term “public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any accommodation, 
resort or amusement which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general 
public, including but not limited to inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, motels, whether 
conducted for the entertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those 
seeking health, recreation or rest, or restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food 
is sold for consumption on the premises, buffets, saloons, barrooms or any store, park or 
enclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold, ice cream parlors, confectioneries, 
soda fountains and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their 
derivatives, or where beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises, 
drug stores, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bathhouses, swimming pools, barber shops, 
beauty parlors, retail stores and establishments, theatres, motion picture houses, 
airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating rinks, amusement and 
recreation parks, fairs, bowling alleys, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool 
parlors, public libraries, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, 
academies, colleges and universities, extension courses and all educational institutions 
under the supervision of this Commonwealth, nonsectarian cemeteries, garages and all 
public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air as well as the stations, 
terminals and airports thereof, financial institutions and all Commonwealth facilities and 
services, including such facilities and services of all political subdivisions thereof, but 
shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature distinctly private.
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Rhode Island 
A “Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” within the meaning of §§ 11-
24-1 - 11-24-3 includes, but is not limited to: (1) inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, 
whether conducted for the entertainment or accommodation of transient guests or of those 
seeking health, recreation or rest; (2) restaurants, eating houses or any place where food 
is sold for consumption on the premises; (3) buffets, saloons, barrooms, or any stores, 
parks, or enclosures where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; (4) ice cream parlors, 
confectioneries, soda fountains, and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations 
or their derivatives, or beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the 
premises; (5) retail stores and establishments, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, rest rooms, 
bath houses, barber shops, beauty parlors, theaters, motion picture houses, music halls, 
airdromes, roof gardens, race courses, skating rinks, amusement and recreation parks, 
fairs, bowling alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool 
parlors, swimming pools, seashore accommodations and boardwalks, and public libraries; 
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(6) garages; (7) all public conveyances operated on land, water or in the air as well as 
their stations and terminals; (8) public halls and public elevators of buildings occupied by 
two (2) or more tenants or by the owner and one or more tenants; and (9) public housing 
projects. Nothing in this section shall be construed to include any place of 
accommodation, resort, or amusement which is in its nature distinctly private.
361
 
 
South Carolina 
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient 
guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more 
than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such 
establishment as his residence; 
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility 
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not 
limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment, or any 
gasoline station; 
(3) any hospital, clinic, or other medical facility which provides overnight 
accommodations; 
(4) any retail or wholesale establishment; 
(5) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, billiard parlor, saloon, barroom, golf 
course, sports arena, stadium, or other place of amusement, exhibition, recreation, or 
entertainment; and 
(6) any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any 
establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is 
physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving 
patrons of such covered establishment.
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South Dakota 
“Public accommodations,” any place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, 
or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, 
charge, or gratuitously. Public accommodation does not mean any bona fide private club 
or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private, except 
when such distinctly private place, establishment, or facility caters or offers services, 
facilities, or goods to the general public for fee or charge or gratuitously, it shall be 
deemed a public accommodation during such period of use;
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“Places of public accommodation, resort or amusement” includes any place, store or 
other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies goods or services to the 
general public or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or 
that is supported directly or indirectly by government funds, except that: 
(A) A bona fide private club is not a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement 
if its policies are determined solely by its members; and 
(B) Its facilities or services are available only to its members and their bona fide 
guests;
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Texas 
“Public accommodation” means any: 
(A) inn, hotel, or motel; 
(B) restaurant, cafeteria, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for 
consumption on the premises; 
(C) bar, nightclub, or other facility engaged in selling alcoholic beverages for 
consumption on the premises; 
(D) motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or 
entertainment; or 
(E) other facility used by or open to members of the public.
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Utah 
(1)(a)“Place of public accommodation” includes every place, establishment, or facility of 
whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the 
general public for a fee or charge, except, an establishment that is: 
(i) located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire; and 
(ii) actually occupied by the proprietor of the establishment as the proprietor's residence. 
(b) A place, establishment, or facility that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods 
to the general public gratuitously shall be within the definition of this term if it receives 
any substantial governmental subsidy or support. 
(c) “Place of public accommodation” does not apply to any institution, church, any 
apartment house, club, or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private 
except to the extent that it is open to the public.
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Vermont 
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(1) “Place of public accommodation” means any school, restaurant, store, establishment 
or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits or 
accommodations are offered to the general public.
367
 
 
Virginia 
Not defined. 
 
Washington 
(d) “Any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement” is hereby 
defined to include, but not to be limited to, any public place, licensed or unlicensed, kept 
for gain, hire or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service, occupancy or 
use of any property or facilities, whether conducted for the entertainment, housing, or 
lodging of transient guests, or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking 
health, recreation, or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise, or for the rendering 
of personal services, or for public conveyance or transportation on land, water or in the 
air, including the stations and terminals thereof and the garaging of vehicles, or where 
food or beverages of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, or where public 
amusement, entertainment, sports, or recreation of any kind is offered with or without 
charge, or where medical service or care is made available, or where the public gathers, 
congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation or public purposes, or public halls, 
public elevators, and public washrooms of buildings and structures occupied by two or 
more tenants, or by the owner and one or more tenants, or any public library or any 
educational institution wholly or partially supported by public funds, or schools of special 
instruction, or nursery schools, or day care centers or children's camps; nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to include, or apply to, any institute, bona fide club, or place 
of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private provided that where public 
use is permitted that use shall be covered by this section; nor shall anything herein 
contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide 
religious or sectarian institution; and the right of a natural parent in loco parentis to direct 
the education and upbringing of a child under his or her control is hereby affirmed. 
(2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race, creed, or color, the full 
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any 
place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.
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West Virginia 
(j) The term “place of public accommodations” means any establishment or person, as 
defined herein, including the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, which 
offers its services, goods, facilities or accommodations to the general public, but shall not 
include any accommodations which are in their nature private. To the extent that any 
penitentiary, correctional facility, detention center, regional jail or county jail is a place of 
public accommodation, the rights, remedies and requirements provided by this article for 
any violation of subdivision (6), section nine of this article shall not apply to any person 
other than: (1) Any person employed at a penitentiary, correctional facility, detention 
center, regional jail or county jail; (2) any person employed by a law-enforcement 
agency; or (3) any person visiting any such employee or visiting any person detained in 
custody at such facility;
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Wisconsin 
(e)1. “Public place of accommodation or amusement” shall be interpreted broadly to 
include, but not be limited to, places of business or recreation; lodging establishments; 
restaurants; taverns; barber , cosmetologist, aesthetician, electrologist, or manicuring 
establishments; nursing homes; clinics; hospitals; cemeteries; and any place where 
accommodations, amusement, goods, or services are available either free or for a 
consideration, subject to subd. 2. 
2. “Public place of accommodation or amusement” does not include a place where a bona 
fide private, nonprofit organization or institution provides accommodations, amusement, 
goods or services during an event in which the organization or institution provides the 
accommodations, amusement, goods or services to the following individuals only: 
a. Members of the organization or institution. 
b. Guests named by members of the organization or institution. 
c. Guests named by the organization or institution.
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Wyoming 
Not Defined 
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